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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation:          A Study on the Effects of e-Navigation on Reducing  
                                             Vessel Accidents 
 
Degree:                               MSc 
 
The dissertation aims to evaluate how and to what extent e-navigation contributes 
to reducing accidents for SOLAS ships as well as non-SOLAS ships, hoping that 
the results are referred to IMO Member States when they are implementing e-
navigation along with the maritime sectors such as shipping companies, crews on 
board ships and manufactures developing e-navigation related systems. 
 
The study focuses on the potential effects of e-navigation based on tool kits of the 
IMO e-navigation for SOLAS ships and services of SMART-navigation, which is 
the Korean approach to implementing the e-navigation concept for both SOLAS 
ships and non-SOLAS ships. The processes and the methodologies that are used by 
the IMO to assess the effects of e-navigation are investigated. The vessel accidents 
for all ships in Korean waters and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide during the 5 
years from 2009 to 2013 are analyzed. The formula is proposed to calculate the 
effects of e-navigation on reducing accidents, which can also be used by other 
Member States of the IMO when they implement e-navigation in their waters. The 
direct causes of accidents, which are reducible by the risk control options (RCOs), 
and the RCOs, which are applicable to non-SOLAS ships, are identified.  
 
Additionally, an expert questionnaire survey is carried out with a view to 
supporting the validity of identifying the RCOs and the direct causes. The results 
are collated and evaluated for the potential effects of e-navigation on reducing 
accidents, in relation to type of accidents as well as type of ships, for comparison 
with the results obtained by the IMO and for reference of other Member States. 
 
The concluding chapter examines the results of analysis of e-navigation's tool kits 
and methodologies to assess their effects on reducing accidents, and discusses the 
potential rate of accident reduction through e-navigation. A number of 
recommendations are made concerning the need for further investigation in 
quantifying the coefficient applied to the proposed formula for evaluating the 
effects of e-navigation. 
 
KEY WORDS : Bayesian Network, Human Error, E-navigation, Maritime Service 
Portfolios, Navigational Accidents, Rate of Risk Reduction, Risk Control Options, 
Safety of Navigation, SMART-navigation, Strategic Implementation Plan 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), ever since it was established, has 
focused on preventing vessel accidents by enacting minimum safety standards for ships 
and crews on board. As a result, there are now very few accidents caused by technical or 
machinery problems in the ship structure itself.  
 
However, accidents still happen mainly due to human error, which is one of the most 
important issues concerning global maritime communities. For example, Rothblum 
(2012) demonstrated that more than 75 % to 96 % of maritime accidents are caused by 
human error. Barsan, Surugiu and Dragomir also demonstrated that more than 80% of 
maritime accidents are caused by human error (TRANSNAV, 2012). Further, these 
accidents indicate a rising trend as examined in paragraph 2.2.2 of this dissertation.  
 
Human error is mainly rooted in fatigue, the lack of situational awareness and the safety 
culture of crews on board ship (Carter-Trahan, 2002)1. There have been limitations to 
prevent human error in terms of quantity and quality of information, complexity, lack of 
providing decision making support to help avoid dangerous navigational situations, and 
lack of response to emergency situations in a timely and adequate manner. One of the 
reasons of these limitations might be the quantitative limitation of the current analog-
                                       
1   The author, Alicia C, shows examples of human errors in his dissertations, An examination of the 
human factors attitudes and knowledge of surface warfare officers (Chapter 4, page 10-14) 
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based maritime communication network and the different types of information used in 
each piece of navigational equipment on board ships as well as between ships and shore-
based stations. This assumption is clearly supported by the user needs, which reflect the 
concerns that they experience most often during their work, according to a survey on e-
navigation as shown in the IMO document NAV 55/INF. 9. 
 
With regard to human error, the other point that the author would like to recall is 
Reason's SWISS Cheese Model which visualizes a number of barriers between existing 
hazards and a potential accident. However, the question why accidents occur - even 
though many layers of safety barriers, including assistance and decision support systems, 
might be installed - remains. Of course, there are holes in each of the layers that, if 
aligned, can allow an accident to occur (Hollnagel, Schröder-Hinrichs & Baldauf, 2012). 
Obviously, it can be interpreted that an accident could be prevented if one of the holes 
among the defense layers was blocked.  
 
For example, this is clearly supported by Wagenaar W.A and Groeneweg J (1987)2, 
introducing that most accidents are caused by multiple reasons that are combined 
together, ranging up to 58 types of reasons. They demonstrated that more than 96 % of 
accidents involve human error, and more than 93 % of accidents involve the 
combination of a number of human errors. The important point from the findings above 
is that each human error in an accident  acts as one of the conditions to cause the 
accident, which means that an accident caused by combined multiple human errors 
might be preventable if one of the errors had been eliminated in advance and the chain 
had been blocked (Rothblum, 2012). 
                                       
2   With regard to this, for detail information, see paragraph 4(p. 594) and Table 4, "Classification of 
human errors in 100 accidents at sea, according to Feggetter' s classification system" (p. 595) of the 
article, "Accidents at sea: Multiple causes and impossible consequences" (Wagenaar W.A and 
Groeneweg J., 1987) 
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With regard to this, IMO has also been making efforts to reduce human error (Etman &  
Halawa, 2006)3. As one of its  latest efforts, IMO has been preparing for the introduction 
of e-navigation. This initiative began in 2006, and IMO finally adopted the Strategic 
Implementation Plan (SIP) for implementing e-navigation into the maritime sectors4. 
The concept of e-navigation is defined, in Annex 20 of MSC 85/26 Add.1 (para. 1.1), as 
follows: 
 
 The harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of 
marine information on board and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth to 
berth navigation and related services for safety and security at sea and 
protection of marine environment.  
 
This might mean that one of the global aims of e-navigation is to digitalize the current 
analog-based navigational equipment on board ships in order to reduce human error by 
providing much more safety information and reducing the burden on crews with regard 
to handling paper work regardless of the safety of navigation. In addition, it may solve 
the complexity 5  of navigational equipment and the lack of decision making by 
supporting crew members to avoid the dangerous situation on the ship's bridge.  
 
In more detail, e-navigation is to enhance the safety of navigation by reducing these 
                                       
3   They explained as "IMO gave attention to the human element of daily ship operation and ship 
management" (para. 4), and, as examples for that, listed the human error-related documents developed 
by IMO in their paper,  "Safety culture, the cure for human error : A critique" (para. 4), such as Res. 
A.850 (20), A.947 (23) and A.900 (21) as well as  the STCW Convention, the ISM Code and the IMO 
Casualty Investigation Code (para. 4) 
 
4   With regard to maritime sectors, it might include the potential e-navigation users in Table 1 of this    
dissertation. The users were identified and defined in the IMO document, MSC 85/26 Add.1 Annex 20. 
 
5    With regard to this, the e-navigation solutions, which were identified based on user needs, for example, 
solution 1 (improved, harmonized and user-friendly bridge design), solution 2 (means for standardized 
and automated reporting), and solution 4 (integration and presentation of available information in 
graphical displays) might contribute to solve this complexity. (See Table 4 in para. 2.2.3 for details). 
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kinds of human errors, or avoiding them in advance through its tool kits such as 7 kinds 
of Risk Control Options (RCOs) and 16 kinds of Maritime Service Portfolio (MSPs). 
With these tool kits of e-navigation on board ship or support from the shore-based 
station, a dangerous situation, which might potentially lead to an accident, could be 
prevented or corrected in advance by monitoring a ship's routing, informing the ship of 
much more safety information, and warning of dangerous situations.  
 
In addition, because of the evolution in the communication network between ships and 
the shore side, e-navigation could greatly improve the efficiency6 of maritime activities. 
For example, the more modernized and standardized information and communication 
technology of e-navigation such as the globally standardized and automated ship-shore 
reporting system7  and the seamless transmission of electronic information and data 
between ship and shore, would allow the IMO to address the efficiency of maritime 
related business as well as the safety of navigation. Thus, IMO is able to talk about the 
safety and efficiency of navigation at the same time, which was generally not possible in 
the past. 
 
The effect of modernized and standardized communication technology as a tool to 
increase efficiency is clearly supported by the European Commission's (EC) e-maritime 
project. The project was initiated in order to increase the efficiency of using the 
resources and to promote the competitiveness of maritime sectors (e-maritime, 2012) by 
                                       
6    The IALA (2011) introduces "the higher efficiency and reduced costs enabled is one of the main broad                  
benefits of e-navigation" (para. 6, p. 3, e-Navigation Frequently Asked, 2011) . 
 
7    With regard to this, NAV 59/6 Annex 1 comments "An investigation undertaken by the MarNIS project 
of 15 European ports found that around 25  documents had to be sent from the ship, or the ship's agent, 
in conjunction with a port call " (p. 25, para. 7.2.4 
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the DIRECTIVE 2010/65/EU, and the DIRECTIVE emphasized8 smooth and effective 
communication as the key element of the project. 
 
Then, how and to what extent could e-navigation reduce such human error that causes 
accidents? This would be an important question to the stake-holders involved in the 
implementation of e-navigation such as Governments, shipping companies, shipyards 
and the relevant equipment manufacturers, and even crews on board  ships. It could also 
contribute to maximizing the benefits of e-navigation in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency when it is introduced and applied to the existing business processes of the 
maritime sector. 
 
With regard to this, IMO's formal safety assessment (FSA) was carried out by Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV, Norway) and Germanischer Lloyd (GL, Germany) for the e-
navigation SIP before it was approved by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at its 
95th session in 2014, including the risk and cost-benefit analysis, as set out in the IMO 
documents, NAV 59/6. Annex 1 (2013) and NCSR 1/28 (2014). Annex 7. According to 
these documents, more than 65 % of the direct causes of ships' navigational accidents, 
including collisions and groundings, caused by human error (p15) could be reduced by 7 
kinds of risk control options (RCOs) of e-navigation.  
 
However, even though the IMO document NAV 56/9. Annex 1 and NCSR 1/28. Annex 
7 provide the feasibility of introducing e-navigation in terms of the cost-benefit as well 
as the effect on reduction of navigational accidents for SOLAS ships by up to 52.7%9, 
                                       
8   With regard to this, the DIRECTIVE 2010/65/EU described as "The full benefits of electronic data 
transmission can only be achieved where there is smooth and effective communication between 
SafeSeaNet, e-Customs and the electronic systems for entering or calling up data" (para. 12). 
 
9   65 % means the rate to reduce the percentage of each detailed direct cause, which is reducible by 7 
kinds of risk control options (RCOs), involving navigational accidents, while 52.7% is the actual rate 
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which is 22.8% among total accidents including other accidents as well as navigational 
accidents, the author assumes that the practices to introduce e-navigation would be 
different among different countries in terms of their priorities, levels and methods of 
applying it in their water areas. This is because the situation of each country's maritime 
safety would be different. Further, non-SOLAS ships might be important factors needed 
to be taken into account implementation of e-navigation because SOLAS ships are 
always interfaced with non-SOLAS ships in real maritime practices. 
 
Therefore, it is important for a country to analyze its own specific data of vessel 
accidents for all ships in its waters and its flagged vessels worldwide, and assess the 
effects of e-navigation in terms of accident types and ship types, including non-SOLAS 
ships as well as SOLAS ships. This would lead the country to maximize the benefits of 
implementing e-navigation in its water areas by establishing an effective and efficient 
National SIP.  
 
For this reason, the author analyzes the vessel accident data for all ships in Korean water 
areas and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide over the period 2009 to 2013, and 
develops a formula to evaluate the effect of e-navigation, which can be also used by  
other Member States of the IMO.  
 
Then, the author evaluates the potential effects of SMART-navigation, which is the 
Korean approach to implementing the e-navigation concept, on reducing accidents by 
applying the formula with various approaches such as SOLAS ships and non-SOLAS 
ships, fishing vessels and non-fishing vessels, and navigational accidents and non-
navigational accidents. The results could be an example to evaluate the effects of e-
navigation by other countries when they are introducing e-navigation to their waters.  
                                                                                                               
to be reduced among navigational accidents, by implementing e-navigation tool kit application, the 7 
kind of RCOs. See paragraph 5.1 for detailed calculation method. 
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1.2 Objectives  
 
This dissertation researches the potential effects of e-navigation on reducing vessel 
accidents. It mainly includes studies and discussion on how and to what extent e-
navigation could possibly reduce vessel accidents.  
 
It is hoped that the result of this study might be referred to the maritime safety policies 
of the Member States of IMO when they are introducing e-navigation, as well as to the 
practices of the private maritime sectors such as shipping companies, crews on board 
ships and the manufacturers of e-navigation related systems. Therefore, this dissertation:  
 
   Identifies what kinds of tool kits the IMO e-navigation has, by examining the 
SIP set out in NCSR 1/28 and NAV 59/6, as means to reduce accidents. 
   Examines related IMO documents over the period from 2006 to 2015 in order to 
determine methodologies to evaluate the effect of e-navigation. 
   Develops a formula, which is applicable to other Member States of IMO as well 
as the Republic of Korea, as a tool to calculate the effect of e-navigation on 
reducing accidents in terms of both SOLAS ships and non-SOLAS ships 
   Analyzes the vessel accident data for all ships in Korean water areas and all 
Korean-flagged ships worldwide, during the 5 years from 2009 to 2013. 
   Reviews the concept and the service scope of SMART-navigation, which is the 
Korean approach to implementing e-navigation, in order to identify the RCOs 
that might be applicable to both SOLAS and non-SOLAS ships. 
  Verifies the validity of methodologies to be used in the dissertation through an 
expert questionnaire. 
   Discusses the potential effect of SMART-navigation on reducing accidents, and 
provides the results as an example for other countries to evaluate the effects of 
e-navigation when they are introducing it into their waters. 
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1.3 Scope of the Study   
 
This dissertation includes 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 shows the background, objectives, 
scope and methodologies of this paper.  
 
Chapter 2 overviews the development of e-navigation, through examining and reviewing 
its related documents developed by the IMO so as to identify what kinds of tool kits the 
IMO's e-navigation has as a means to prevent vessel accidents and how such tool kits 
have been developed and finalized. 
  
Chapter 3 determines the methodology to be used in this dissertation for determining the 
effects of e-navigation, and especially the effects of SMART-navigation on reducing 
accidents for all ships in Korean water areas and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide in 
terms of non-SOLAS ships as well as SOLAS ships. To determine the methodologies, 
this chapter reviews the risk and cost-benefit analysis that the FSA team carried out as 
set out in the IMO document, NAV 59/6. Annex 1 and NCSR 1/28. Annex 7, in addition 
to other e-navigation related documents developed by the relevant Sub-Committees of  
IMO. 
 
Chapter 4 shows the result of analyzing accident data for all ships in Korean water areas 
and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide during the 5 years from 2009 to 2013. The 
analysis is focused mainly on identifying the accident types in terms of navigational 
accidents and others, the accident ship types in terms of SOLAS and non-SOLAS ships, 
and the detailed direct causes of accidents in terms of human error, technical failures and 
external factors, which are expected to be preventable by e-navigation.  
 
The methods and formats analyzing the data were followed in the same manner as 
carried out in the document, NAV 59/6. Annex 1 and NCSR 1/28. Annex 7, in order to 
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harmonize the level of the rate of risk reduction of accidents. However, the author 
analyzes all kinds of accident data, including SOLAS and non-SOLAS, as well as non-
fishing and fishing vessels, whilst the document NAV 59/6. Annex 1 and NCSR 1/28. 
Annex 7 analyzed only SOLAS ships except non-SOLAS ships and fishing vessels. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the effect of the SMART-navigation on reducing accidents based on 
the result of analyzing accident data in chapter 3. To compare and identify differences to 
results obtained by the IMO, the chapter reviews the concept and services of SMART-
navigation, and defines the scope of the RCOs that are considered to have an effect on 
reducing accidents for the non-SOLAS ships including fishing vessels. In addition, the 
chapter develops a formula to calculate the effect of e-navigation, which can be used by 
the other Member States of the IMO not only by the Republic of Korea. Then, the 
chapter provides the results of evaluating the effects of SMART-navigation on the rate 
of accident reduction as an example to be used by other Member States to assess the 
effects of e-navigation when they introduce it to their waters.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 gives a summary of this dissertation and concludes the effects of e-
navigation on reducing vessel accidents.  
 
1.4 Methodology and Sources of Information  
 
The research question of this paper is "What percentage of vessel accidents could be 
reduced by the introducing e-navigation?". To answer this question, this paper uses two  
methodologies, namely qualitative and the quantitative analysis.  
 
For the qualitative analysis, an examination and review of the e-navigation related 
documents developed by IMO and other related research papers are carried out in order 
to define the analysis tools to calculate the rate of risk reduction of accidents, and 
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identify the tool kits of e-navigation that have an effect on reducing accidents. All of 
these documents were collected from the IMO website, internet and WMU library.  
 
An overview of SMART-navigation is also conducted by qualitative analysis through 
examining and reviewing its components as described in the preliminary feasibility 
study on SMART-navigation and the study of systems to prevent safety accidents in 
maritime sectors, which were carried out by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries 
(MOF). 
 
On the other hand, the quantitative methodology focuses on calculating the rate of the  
effects of e-navigation on reducing accidents. The calculation is carried out by the 
formula developed by the author based on the methodology used in Annex 1 of NAV 
59/6 (May 31, 2013). The detailed direct causes of vessel accidents and the RCOs, 
which are applicable to non-SOLAS ships, are also identified by quantitative analysis 
based on the statistics and law data-base that have been accumulated by the Korea 
Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST).  
 
In addition, the expert questionnaire survey is carried out as one of the quantitative 
analysis items in order to verify the validity of methodologies which were used in 
calculating the rate of reducing accidents for non-SOLAS ships. 
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2. TOOL KITS OF IMO E-NAVIGATION TO REDUCE ACCIDENTS 
 
The IMO document, NAV 59/6. Annex 1, demonstrates that e-navigation could reduce, 
by more than 65 %, the detailed direct causes of ships' collisions and groundings. What 
kinds of main tool kits of e-navigation function as the tools to reduce such accidents, and 
how? To answer these questions, the chapter is to examine in detail the process by which 
those e-navigation tool kits were developed, and what these respective e-navigation tool 
kits are. In addition, the chapter is to examine the user needs of e-navigation and the 
detailed direct causes of navigational accidents, including collisions and groundings, in 
terms of human errors, technical failures and external factors. It is because that user 
needs and detailed direct causes are to be used as the basis to identify the tool kits.  
 
In this chapter, the term "tool kits" cover all kinds of functional and technical, legal 
"systems" and "services" related to e-navigation, for example, such as its solutions, risk 
control options (RCOs) and maritime service portfolios (MSPs).  
 
2.1 Overview of IMO e-navigation 
 
2.1.1  History of developing e-navigation 
 
E-navigation was initiated by a joint proposal, including Japan, the Marshall Islands, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, the UK and the USA, to the MSC of  IMO at its eight-
first session in 2006 (MSC 81/23/10). Those States suggested that : 
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 E-navigation would contribute to reduce navigational accidents, errors and 
failures by developing standards for an accurate and cost effective system that 
would make a major contribution to the IMO's agenda of safe, secure and 
efficient shipping on clean oceans (page 1, executive summary, MSC 81/23/10). 
 
Following this proposal, the NAV Sub-Committee developed a "Strategy for the 
development and implementation of e-navigation (NAV 54/25 Annex 12)" and "Time 
frame for implementation of the proposed e-navigation strategy (NAV 54/25 Annex 13)", 
in co-operation with the COMSAR Sub-Committee and with the relevant input provided 
by other relevant organizations such as IALA and IHO, over a period of two years (2006 
to 2008). The strategy and the time frame were submitted to the MSC of IMO at its 
eight-fifth session (2009) and were approved by the Committee as set out in MSC 85/26 
Add 1 (Annex 20) and MSC 85/26. Add.1 ( Annex 21), respectively. The MSC 85/26 
Add 1 (Annex 20) explains the core objectives of e-navigation  as  follows:  
 
  (1) facilitate safe and secure navigation of vessels having regard to 
hydrographic, meteorological and navigational information and risks; (2) 
facilitate vessel traffic observation and management from shore facilities; (3)  
facilitate communications, including data exchange, among users; (4) provide 
opportunities for improving the efficiency of transport and logistics; (5) support 
the effective operation of contingency response, and SAR services; (6) 
demonstrate defined levels of accuracy, integrity and continuity appropriate to a 
safety-critical system; (7) integrate and present information on board and ashore 
through a human-machine interface which maximizes navigational safety 
benefits and minimizes any risks of confusion10 or misinterpretation on the part 
                                       
10    With regard to this, according to the report of e-navigation underway conference 2014, John Murray 
(2014) emphasized that "the fault by watch-keepers causing accidents are mainly due to the distraction 
or confusion, emphasizing the need to retain the skills of watch-keepers while simplifying displays" 
(page 8). 
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of the user; (8) integrate and present information onboard and ashore to manage 
the workload of the users, while also motivating the user and supporting 
decision-making; (9) incorporate training and familiarization requirements for 
the users throughout the development and implementation process; (10) facilitate 
global coverage, consistent standards and arrangements, and mutual 
compatibility and interoperability of equipment, systems, symbology and 
operational procedures, so as to avoid potential conflicts between users; and 
(11) support scalability, to facilitate use by all potential maritime users (p. 3). 
 
The approved strategy, even though there were some points that were somewhat 
overwhelming and included many issues to be solved (para. 11.19, MSC 85/26), became 
the stepping stone for the MSC to move forward to further development of the strategy 
for e-navigation. After this, the joint work done by COMSAR, NAV and STW 
(Standards of Training and Watchkeeping) Sub-Committees were undertaken to develop 
a coordinated approach to implement the approved e-navigation strategy according to 
the time framework as set  out in  MSC 85/26. Add. 1 as shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 Time framework for implementing SIP (MSC 85/26) 
 
Source: Developed by the author by using data given on page 1 of  MSC 85/26. Add.1. Annex 21. This 
figure is to show the time framework more clearly. 
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The above tasks had been undertaken by 2012 and their results were submitted to the 
MSC of IMO at its ninetieth session. However, the MSC of IMO at its ninety-first 
session extended the target date for completing the SIP of e-navigation until 2014 
because the Committee noted that the results needed further revision and finalization of 
the work.  
 
Then, the MSC, in its ninetieth and ninety-first sessions, instructed both STW 43 and 
NAV 58 to progress further work by re-establishing the Correspondence Group (CG) 
and endorsed the joint plan of work on e-navigation for the COMSAR, NAV and STW 
Sub-Committees for the period 2012-2014.  
 
Finally, based on the report submitted by the CG (NAV 59/6), the MSC of IMO at its 
ninety-forth session on November 26, 2014, approved the e-navigation SIP, as set out in 
document NCSR 1/28, Annex 7. According to the SIP, the e-navigation is expected to be 
fully operational from 2020 if five prioritized e-navigation solutions as well as 18 kinds 
of tasks  are implemented over the period  2014 to 2019 according to the time 
framework as shown in Table 2.  
 
According to Hagen (2015), who is the chair of the Correspondence Group (CG) on 
IMO e-navigation, the approved SIP would be continuously developed and supported 
with IMO in the leading role, and included11 in the IMO High-level Action Plans for 
2016-2019.  
 
 
                                       
11    In line with this, interested Member States may submit proposals to the Committee for the inclusion of 
new planned or unplanned outputs in the High-level Action Plan of the Organization based on the 
identified tasks contained in this SIP (MSC 95/21, p 78, paragraph 21.2.17,  MSC 95/22, p 88, 
paragraph 22.2.10, MSC 95/22, p72, paragraph 19.12.6). 
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Table 2  Time framework for eighteen tasks to implement SIP 
 
Source: p. 18, Annex 7 of NCSR 1/28. "T" means "Task to be done" (For details, see p. 13-16 Annex 7 of 
NCSR 1/28). 
 
2.1.2 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) of IMO 
 
As examined in the history of developing e-navigation, for the time being, the SIP is a 
master for the implementation of e-navigation, which was approved by MSC 94 in 2014, 
as set out in the Annex 20 of NCSR 1/28. That is, the SIP could be said to include all 
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aspects with regard to the implementation of e-navigation. Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine in detail the components of the SIP in order to understand what kind of e-
navigation tool kits reduce accidents and how.  
 
The SIP was developed based on user needs according to 5 main steps from the 
beginning stage as follows: (1) identifying user needs; (2) identifying the key elements 
to meet them; (3) gap analysis between the key elements and the current technologies; 
(4) identifying the tool kits of e-navigation to meet user needs, and (5) carrying out the 
risk and cost-benefit analysis against the tool kits. 
 
The steps from (1) to (4) above had been continuously conducted, reviewed and 
finalized mainly by the NAV and COMSAR Sub-Committees and the MSC, including 
the series of CGs and Working Groups (WGs) established by each committee, from 
2006 when e-navigation was proposed jointly by several Member States until 2013.  
 
All of these outputs were assessed and verified through the FSA (NAV 59/6, summary) 
as shown in the Figure 1. The FSA12 is the standard risk assessment tool to be used for 
the development of new rules and regulations of IMO as described in the Annex of MSC 
83/INF.2, "Consolidated text of the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for 
use in the IMO rule-making (MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392)" (p. 3).  
 
                                       
12   Hermanski, G. & Daley, C. (2005) summarized the case of applying the FSA and commented that: 
"Since IMO published its interim guidelines on FSA (MSC/Circ.829-MEPC/Circ.335) in 1997 many 
FSA studies were conducted. Member governments, non-governmental observer organizations, 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) and individual class societies carried out 
variety of FSA studies" (p. 8) 
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Figure 1 Steps of FSA used in developing the SIP  
Source: NAV 56/8 (page 17) 
 
Through the processes above, the SIP was finally developed. The SIP is mainly 
composed of 3 kinds of components with regard to the e-navigation tool kits as set out in 
Annex 7 of NCSR 1/28 (p. 2-3, p27-34) as follows: 
 
  The five prioritized solutions, including S1, S2, S3, S4 and S9, 
  The seven RCOs with the sub-solutions related to, and 
  The sixteen MSPs for 6 areas. 
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The SIP contains other components, which are to be undertaken in order to prepare and 
provide these 3 kinds of tool kits from 2014 to 2019, as set out in Annex 7 of NCSR 
1/28, as follows: 
 
  (1) 18 Tasks with expected deliverables, transition arrangements and  
implementation schedule (p. 13-16), 
 (2)  Examples of key enablers of e-navigation (p. 18, Annex 7 of NCSR 1/28), 
(3)  Examples of key messages to promote the benefits of e-navigation through 
each solutions according to the stakeholders (p. 37-40), 
(4)  Identification of communication systems for e-navigation; Communications 
are a key for e-navigation. Any communications systems used must be able 
to the deliver appropriate MSPs in the 6 areas defined, as per S9, as well as 
delivering reliable ship reporting as identified in S2 (p. 19), and 
(5)  Ship and shore architecture for  solutions13 as shown in Figure 2 (p. 18-19). 
                                       
13   With regard to the architecture, Annex 7 of  NCSR 1/28 explains  that : 
 
 The Figure 2 shows the principle of an information and data flow in the e-navigation 
architecture. The figure shows the complete overarching e-navigation architecture, and defines 
two additional important features: the CMDS that spans the whole of the horizontal axis; and  
the World Wide Radio Navigation System (WWRNS) (page 18). 
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Figure 2 Overarching e-navigation architecture 
Source: Annex 7 of  NCSR 1/28 ( page 18) 
 
2.1.3 Identifying user needs 
 
Following the decision by both the Sub-Committees of NAV 53 and COMSAR 11 that 
the e-navigation strategy should be user-driven rather than technology driven, the work 
to identity the user needs was undertaken by the intersessional CG and the results 
included in MSC 85/26 Add.1. Annex 20, "Strategy for the development and 
implementation of e-navigation".  
 
The basic concept of user needs of e-navigation is to avoid system failures causing 
delays because the ship is now deemed unseaworthy, loss of basic good seamanship by 
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crews, inappropriate substitution of the human element by technology and degradation 
of bridge resource management and best practices by the crew (paragraph 7, page 5, 
MSC 85/26 Add.1. Annex 20) 
 
The documents MSC 85/26 Add.1 Annex 20 emphasized the importance of applying 
ergonomic principles to the electronic systems of e-navigation, including the 
presentation of information for users, so as to reduce single person errors and enhance 
team operations (paragraph 8.2.5, p7). Further to this, the document also recommended 
the concept of user needs in more detail as shown in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3 Potential e-navigation users  
No Shipborne users Shore-based users 
1 Generic SOLAS ships Ship owners/operators, safety managers 
2 Commercial tourism craft VTM organizations 
3 High-speed craft VTS centres 
4 Mobile VTS assets Pilot organizations 
5 Pilot vessels Coastguard organizations 
6 Coastguard vessels Law enforcement organizations 
7 SAR vessels National administrations 
8 Law enforcement vessels (police, customs, etc) Coastal administrations 
9 Nautical assistance vessels (tugs, salvage, tenders) Port authorities 
10 Counter pollution vessels Security organizations 
11 Military vessels Port State control authorities 
12 Fishing vessels Incident managers 
13 Leisure craft Counter pollution organizations 
14 Ferries Military organizations 
15 Dredgers Fairway maintenance organizations 
16 A to N service vessels A to N organizations 
17 Ice patrol/breakers Meteorological organizations 
18 Offshore energy vessel (supply, lay barges, survey) Hydrographic Offices/Agencies 
19 Hydrographic & Oceanographic research vessels Ship owners/operator, logistics managers 
20  News organizations 
21  Coastal management authorities 
22  Marine accident investigators 
23  Health and safety organizations 
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24  Insurance and financial organizations 
25  National, regional and local governments 
26  Port authorities (strategic) Ministries 
27  Marine environment managers 
28  Fisheries management 
29  Tourism agencies (logistics) 
30  Energy providers 
31  Ocean research institutes 
32  Training organizations 
33  Equipment and system manufacturers 
sum 18 33 
 
Source: MSC 85/26/Add.1. Annex 20 (p. 14-15) 
 
The document MSC 85/26 Add.1 Annex 20 also identified 8 kinds of user needs as 
follows: "(1) Common maritime information/data structure; (2) Automated and 
standardized reporting functions; (3) Effective and robust communications; (4) Human 
centred presentation needs; (5) Human machine interface; (6) Data and system 
integrity; (7) Analysis; and (8) Implementation issues" (p. 15). 
  
However, the identified user needs in the strategy were somewhat overwhelming (para. 
11.18, p. 79, MSC 85/26) and based only on feedback from the high-level generic users 
such as Member States, other maritime organizations, and interested parties, and limited 
to the typical SOLAS ship and a generic shore authority (para. 8.2, p5, MSC 
85/26/Add.1 Annex 20). 
 
Therefore, the user needs needed to be identified in more detail and the identification 
was undertaken again by the consecutively established CG and the WG over a period of 
from 2008 to 2010. During this period, in the document NAV 55/ INF. 9, the user needs 
were identified through a questionnaire with 353 persons responding in total, whose 
average experience as a mariner was 16.6 years (p. 2). This document was further 
developed by the CG and WG of the NAV Sub-Committee, which was chaired by Mr. 
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John Erik Hagen, as set out in the document NAV 56/WP.5/Rev.1 and  NAV 56/20. 
These two documents completed the comprehensive works related to the implementation 
of e-navigation, including indentified tool kits and services to support user needs in a 
harmonized and holistic manner (para. 8.3, p. 20, NAV 56/20).  
 
Based on these results above, e-navigation user needs were finalized as set out in the 
document COMSAR 15/11, including Annex 1(INITIAL GAP ANALYSIS – shipboard 
users), Annex 2 (INITIAL GAP ANALYSIS – shore-based users) and Annex 3 
(INITIAL GAP ANALYSIS – Search and Rescue).  
 
2.1.4 Analyzing human errors that cause accidents 
 
The objective of the FSA was to identify relevant hazards pertaining to navigation, to 
quantify related safety risks, and to identify and prioritize a set of RCOs deemed to 
reduce said risks. The result was submitted to NAV 59 (NAV 59/6), showing, in 
conclusion, that e-navigation has effects on reducing by more than 65 %, the risk of 
vessels' collisions and groundings through providing the seven RCOs.  
 
To achieve the objective, the FSA team applied the casualty database of the IHS 
Fairplay14 for the period from 2001 to 2010, but also used it together with accident data 
from the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA). For the purpose of analyzing the direct 
causes of navigational accidents, the FSA team first classified the initial accidents, and 
then identified  the direct causes of accidents according to the structure given in Figure 3.  
                                       
14   IHS Fairplay, which is belonging to the IHS (Information Handling Service) enterprise founded in 
1959, provides maritime databases, evolved from the Lloyd’s Register of Ships books, such as ship, 
vessel movement, casualty, ownership and port database. The enterprise has two headquarters; a global 
headquarter based at Englewood, U.S.A, and a regional headquarter based at Bracknell, U.K. 
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Figure 3 Methodology to identify the direct causes of accidents 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 56/6 (p. 12)  
 
Table 4 shows the statistics analyzed by the FSA team for accidents involving the 
selected ship types over the time-span from 2001 to 2010, and Table 5 shows that more 
than 43.2 % were navigational accidents, including 21.6% of collisions and 21.6% of 
groundings, among the total 12,819 accidents and more than 21.9 % of losses of life 
among the total 6,262 happened in navigational accidents. 
 
Table 4 Number of events and loss of life  
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 56/6 (page 9) 
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Table 5 Composition of events and loss of life 
Ship 
Type  
Accidents Type Loss of Life 
Navigational Non-
Nav 
Navigational Non-
Nav collision Grounding sum collision Grounding sum 
Cargo 
ship 
2336 
(18.2%) 
2286 
(17.8%) 
4621 
(36.1%) 
5133 
(40.0%) 
238 
(3.8%) 
200 
(3.2%) 
438 
(7.0%) 
1563 
(25.0%) 
Pass-
enger 
245 
(1.9%) 
321 
(2.5A%) 
566 
(4.4%) 
1543 
(12.0%) 
53 
(0.8%) 
836 
(13.3%%) 
889( 
14.2%) 
3166 
(50.5%) 
Others 194 (1.5%) 
162 
(1.3%) 
356 
(2.8%) 
599 
(4.7%) 
41 
(0.7%) 
4 
(0.1%) 
45 
(0.7%) 
163 
(2.6%) 
Sub-
Total 
2775 
(21.6%) 
2768 
(21.6%) 
5543 
(43.2%) 
7275 
(56.8%) 
332 
(5.3%) 
1040 
(16.6%) 
1372 
(21.9%) 
4892 
(78.1%) 
Total 12819 6264 
 
Source: The author developed this  to show data more clearly, by reassembling data given in Table 4. 
 
The outcome of this analysis is that more than 65 % of all navigational accidents were 
caused by human error, while 18% are caused by technical failure and 17% by external 
factors (para. 5.1, Annex 1 of NAV 59/6). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the detailed causes of 
navigational accidents in terms of human error, technical failures and external factors. 
 
 
Figure 4  Human error cause distribution  
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 56/6 (page 13-14)  
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Figure 5 Technical failure cause distribution  
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 56/6 (page 15).  
 
 
Figure 6 External factor cause distribution  
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 56/6 (page 15)  
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2.2 Main tool kits of IMO e-navigation 
 
Up to now, the author has summarized the development of IMO's e-navigation and its 
SIP, and found that it has mainly 3 kinds of tool kits, including the five prioritized e-
navigation solutions, the seven RCOs and the sixteen MSPs in paragraph 2.1.2. There 
are several reasons 15  for IMO to introduce e-navigation. With regard to this, the 
document MSC 85/26/Add.1 emphasized that:  
 
 If e-navigation could assist in improving the reliability of the decision-making 
process, both by well-designed onboard systems and closer cooperation with 
vessel traffic management (VTM) instruments and systems, the risk of 
navigational accidents and their inherent liabilities could be dramatically 
reduced (p. 2). 
 
These tool kits might contribute to improve the reliability of the relevant decision-
making process, and reduce accidents as a result of that. The chapter examines the tool 
kits of IMO's e-navigation in more detail, involving its solutions, RCOs and MSPs.  
 
2.2.1 The e-navigation solutions  
 
Based on the identified user needs and analysis of accidents, the NAV 57 decided to 
carry out a gap analysis in order to identify e-Navigation solutions to meet user needs, 
taking into account the Human Element Analyzing Process (HEAP), and the document 
NAV 58/6 was submitted as the result of gap analysis.  
                                       
15  The document MSC 85/26/Add.1 summarized the reasons as follows: "the rising trends of navigational 
accidents; the numerous examples of such accidents might have been avoided if there had been 
suitable input to the navigation decision-making process; and the fact that 60% of collisions and 
groundings are caused by human error" (para. 3.2) 
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Annex of the NAV 58/6 provides a list of practical e-navigation solutions in terms of 4 
aspects; (1) the operational (procedural / automation), (2) the human element, the 
technical (H/W, S/W, equipment), (3) the regulatory (regulation, standard), and (4) the 
training  (human element). Table 6 summarizes and describes the IMO agreed and 
prioritized solutions and their sub-solutions. 
 
Table 6 Description of Solution and its Sub-Solutions  
Solutions and Sub- 
Solution 
Description 
S1 
improved, 
harmonized and user-
friendly bridge design 
S1.1 
Ergonomically improved and harmonized bridge and workstation 
layout.  
S1.2 
Extended use of standardized and unified symbology for relevant 
bridge equipment.  
S1.3 
Standardized manuals for operations and familiarization to be 
provided in electronic format for relevant equipment  
S1.4 
Standard default settings, save/recall settings, and S-mode 
functionalities on relevant equipment.  
S1.5 All bridge equipment to follow IMO Bridge Alert Management 
S1.6 
Information accuracy/reliability indication functionality for 
relevant equipment.  
S1.6.1 
Graphical or numerical presentation of levels of reliability 
together with the provided information.  
S1.7 
Integrated bridge display system (INS) for improved access to 
shipboard information.  
S1.8 GMDSS equipment integration – one common interface.  
S2 
means for 
standardized and 
automated reporting;  
 
S2.1 Single-entry of reportable information in single-window solution.  
S2.2 Automated collection of internal ship data for reporting.  
S2.3 
Automated or semi-automated digital distribution/communication 
of required reportable information, including both "static" 
documentation and "dynamic" information.  
S2.4 
All national reporting requirements to apply standardized digital 
reporting formats based on recognized internationally harmonized 
standards, such as IMO FAL Forms or SN.1/Circ.289.  
S3 
improved reliability, 
resilience and 
integrity of bridge 
equipment and 
navigation 
information;  
 
S3.1 
Standardized self-check/built-in integrity test (BIIT) with 
interface for relevant equipment (e.g. bridge equipment).  
S3.2 
Standard endurance, quality and integrity verification testing for 
relevant bridge equipment, including software.  
S3.3 
Perform information integrity tests based on integration of 
navigational equipment – application of INS integrity monitoring 
concept.  
S3.4 
Improved reliability and resilience of onboard PNT information 
and other critical navigation data by integration with and backup 
of by integration with external and internal systems.  
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S4 
integration and 
presentation of 
available information 
in graphical displays 
received via 
communication 
equipment 
S4.1 
Integration and presentation of available information in graphical 
displays (including MSI, AIS, charts, radar, etc.) received via 
communication equipment.  
S4.1.1 
Implement a Common Maritime Data Structure and include 
parameters for priority, source, and ownership of information.  
S4.1.2 
Standardized interfaces for data exchange should be developed to 
support transfer of information from communication equipment to 
navigational systems (INS).  
S4.1.3 
Provide mapping of specific services (information available) to 
specific regions (e.g. maritime service portfolios) with status and 
access requirements.  
S4.1.4 
Provision of system for automatic source and channel 
management on board for the selection of most appropriate 
communication means (equipment) according to criteria as, band 
width, content, integrity, costs.  
S4.1.5 
Routing and filtering of information on board (weather, intended 
route, etc.).  
S4.1.6 
Provide quality assurance process to ensure that all data is reliable 
and is based on a consistent common reference system (CCRS) or 
converted to such before integration and display.  
S4.1.7 
Implement harmonized presentation concept of information 
exchanged via communication equipment including standard 
symbology and text support taking into account human element 
and ergonomics design principles to ensure useful presentation 
and prevent overload.  
S4.1.8 
Develop a holistic presentation library as required to support 
accurate presentation across displays.  
S4.1.9 
Provide Alert functionality of INS concepts to information 
received by communication equipment and integrated into INS.  
S4.1.10 
Harmonization of conventions and regulations for navigation and 
communication equipment.  
S9 
improved 
Communication of 
VTS Service Portfolio 
S9 
Improved communication of VTS service portfolio (not limited to 
VTS stations)  
 
Source: Solutions (para. 15, p. 5, NAV 59/6), Sub-Solution (Tables 1 to 5, Annex 7 of NCSR 1/28) 
 
These five solutions shown in Table 6 above were finalized with a goal-based approach 
based on the risk and cost-benefit analysis according to the FSA process and the 
methodology of the HEAP (para. 19, p. 5, NAV 59/6). In addition, these solutions were 
used as the basis for creating the SIP and the RCOs as well as for the further 
implementation of e-navigation. 
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2.2.2 Risk Control Options (RCOs)  
 
In order to identify the tangible and manageable RCOs, the FSA team used the process 
as depicted in Figure 7, by merging the results of user needs, gaps analysis and 
prioritized solutions with the accident data analysis. Through this process, the seven 
RCOs with sub-solutions were decided as the RCOs to provide cost-effective risk 
reductions in a cost-effective manner (p. 6, para. 24-26, NAV 59/6) as follows: 
 
  RCO 1: Integration of navigation information and equipment including 
improved software quality assurance (related to sub-solutions: S1.6, S1.7, S3.1, 
S3.2, S3.3, S4.1.2, and S4.1.6);  
  RCO 2: Bridge alert management (S1.5);  
  RCO 3: Standardized mode(s) for navigation equipment (S1.4); 
  RCO 4: Automated/standardized ship-shore reporting (S2.1, S2.2, S2.3, S2.4); 
  RCO 5: Improved reliability and resilience of onboard PNT systems (S3.4); 
  RCO 6: Improved shore-based services (S4.1.3 and solution S9); 
  RCO 7: Bridge and workstation layout standardization (S1.1). 
 
 
Figure 7 RCO identification process  
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (p. 20) 
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2.2.3 Maritime Service Portfolios (MSPs)  
 
The concept of MSPs was first introduced at the fifty-seventh session of NAV Sub-
Committee (para. 23-26, NAV 57/6).  MSP is a part of the improved provision of 
services to vessels through e-navigation (NCSR 1/28 Annex 7, paragraph 17), and 
defined and described as the set of operational and technical services and their level of 
service, with the need for information and communication services, provided by a 
stakeholder in a given area16 (para. 23, NAV 57/6).  
 
The MSPs were finalized as in Table 7 below by the CG on e-navigation established by 
NAV 58. The CG proposed 17 kinds of MSPs, in the document NAV 59/6. Annex 3 
with detailed descriptions. However, through the discussion of the Working Group 
established by NAV 59, one of them, "Remote monitoring of ships systems"  was 
deleted17 
 
Table 7 List of the Maritime Service Portfolios (MSPs)  
MSPs Services Responsible Service Provider 
MSP1 VTS Information Service (IS)  VTS Authority  
MSP2 Navigational Assistance Service (NAS)  
National Competent VTS Authority/Coastal or 
Port Authority  
MSP3 Traffic Organization Service (TOS)  
National Competent VTS Authority/Coastal or 
Port Authority  
MSP4 Local Port Service (LPS)  Local Port/Harbour Operator  
                                       
16   With regard to this, the SIP defines 6 areas : "(1) port areas and approaches; (2) coastal waters and 
confined or restricted areas; (3) open sea and open areas; (4) areas with offshore and/or 
infrastructure developments; (5) polar areas; and (6) other remote areas" (para. 18, p. 11, Annex 7 of 
NCSR 1/28). 
 
17   During the discussion, this MSP was severely argued between delegations and deleted according to the 
opinion, especially the strong suggestion by the representative from ICC, that it is not directly related 
to the safety of navigation. The author participated in the Working Group as the delegation of the 
Republic of Korea.  
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MSP5 Maritime Safety Information Service (MSI  National Competent Authority  
MSP6 Pilotage service  Pilot Authority/Pilot Organization  
MSP7 Tugs Service  Tug Authority  
MSP8 Vessel Shore Reporting  
National Competent Authority, 
Shipowner/Operator/Master  
MSP9 Telemedical Assistance Service (TMAS)  
National Health Organization/dedicated 
Health Organization  
MSP10 Maritime Assistance Service (MAS)  Coastal/Port Authority/Organization  
MSP11 Nautical Chart Service  
National Hydrographic Authority/ 
Organization  
MSP12 Nautical Publications Service  
National Hydrographic Authority/ 
Organization  
MSP13 Ice Navigation Service  National Competent Authority Organization  
MSP14 Meteorological Information Service  
National Meteorological Authority/WMO/ 
Public Institutions  
MSP15 
Rea-time Hydrographic and 
Environmental Information Service  
National Hydrographic and Meteorological 
Authorities  
MSP16 Search and Rescue Service  SAR Authorities  
 
Source : Annex 7 of NCSR  1/28 
 
2.3 Conclusion of the tool kits of e-navigation  
 
Up to now, the author has examined the tool kits of e-navigation, and their developed 
processes and functions. As a result, the author has identified three kinds of main tool 
kits of IMO e-navigation, including the five solutions, seven RCOs and sixteen MSPs. 
They were finalized through a goal-based approach based on the cost-benefit and risk 
analysis by the FSA team (para. 19, p. 5, NAV 59/6).  
 
In brief, e-navigation, using these tool kits, might be able to enhance the capability of  
shore-based stations to manage and assist the safety of navigation in an efficient and 
timely manner. It also supports the decision making process and provides safety 
information to crews on board ships, which might lead the crews to avoid or detect 
 32 
 
human error in advance. This is clearly supported by the current definition and concept 
of e-navigation. The concept of e-navigation was finally defined in Annex 20 of MSC 
85/26 Add. 1, "Strategy for the development and implementation of e-navigation", which 
was submitted by the NAV Sub-Committee in 2009, as follows: 
 
The harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of 
marine information on board and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth 
to berth navigation and related services for safety and security at sea and 
protection of marine environment (para. 1.1, p. 1).  
 
This might mean that e-navigation is to enhance the safety of navigation and increase the 
efficiency of maritime-related businesses by implementing its three kinds of tool kits. 
The words "to enhance" here might mean to increase the quantity and quality of 
managing safety of navigation by improving the maritime communication network, the 
structure of information and services, and the relevant systems and equipment on board 
ship and ashore. This is clearly supported by the vision of e-navigation, involving the 
elements of communication, on board ship and ashore, as described in the  MSC 85/26. 
Annex 20 (para. 4.1, p. 2) 
 
In other words, as the author mentioned in the background, the more modernized 
information and communication technology of e-navigation such as the globally 
standardized and automated ship-shore reporting system and the seamless transmission 
of electronic information and data between ship and shore might provide crews on board 
ship with more decision-making support and also to minimize their work-loads, enabling 
them to focus on the safety of navigation. In addition, these electronic technologies of e-
navigation might increase the efficiency of the maritime-related businesses, as well. One 
of the reasons why the IMO's e-navigation strategy has been driven based on its user 
needs is because of this.  
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In conclusion, the author concluded, based on the examination done in this Chapter, that 
the tool kits of e-navigation reducing vessel collisions and groundings by 65% are the 
five prioritized solutions, the sixteen MPSs, and especially the seven RCOs, and 
summarized the relationships between these tool kits as shown in  Table 8.  
 
Table 8 Relation between Tool kits of e-navigation to reduce accidents  
RCOs Functions and MSPs 
Relevant 
Solutions 
(RCO 1)  
Integration of 
navigation   
information and 
equipment 
including 
improved 
software quality 
assurance 
to provide integrated and augmented functions to the 
navigator, i.e. an improved basis for navigational decision-
making, taken from the INS standard, as follows; 
 
   Route planning and monitoring : the route check 
against hazards based on the planned minimum under 
keel clearance as specified by the mariner; overlaying 
radar video data on the chart to indicate navigational 
objects, restraints and hazards to own ship in order to 
allow position monitoring evaluation and object 
identification; determination of deviations between set 
values and actual values  
   Supporting decision making of collision avoidance 
   Providing navigation control data :  under keel 
clearance (UKC), STW, SOG, COG, position, heading, 
ROT (measured or derived from change of heading), 
rudder angle, propulsion data;  set and drift, wind 
direction and speed (true and/or relative selectable by 
the operator); the active mode of steering or speed 
control; time and distance to wheel-over or to the next 
waypoint; safety related messages e.g. AIS safety-
related and binary messages, NAVTEX, SafetyNet or 
other GMDSS information.  
   Status and data display : ship's static, dynamic and 
voyage-related AIS data ; safety related messages, such 
as AIS safety-related and binary messages, Navtex, 
SafetyNet or other GMDSS information;  
   Function editing AIS own ship's data and information 
to be transmitted by AIS messages.  
   Redundancy of important equipment  and Software 
testing  
 S1.6 
 S1.7 
 S3.1 
 S3.2 
 S3.3 
 S4.1.2 
 S4.1.6 
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(RCO 2)  
Bridge alert 
management 
To provide alert management in order to enable the bridge team 
to devote full attention to the safe navigation of the ship and to 
immediately identify any abnormal situation requiring action to 
maintain the safe  
 
   Danger of collision, Danger of grounding  
S1.5 
(RCO 3)  
Standardized 
mode(s) for 
navigation 
equipment 
Safe navigation relies on the ability of key personnel to easily 
operate navigational equipment as well as comprehend the 
information that is presented to them. Lack of familiarity with 
bridge equipment and/or slow response due to not finding correct 
information/control/alarm is thus considered to adversely affect 
safe navigation. Standard modes are to provide a standardized and 
common display familiar to all stakeholders, reducing the need 
for personnel to familiarize themselves with variations of HMIs in 
order to safely navigate.  
 
  Offer default display configurations for the ECDIS and 
the radar to provide the bridge team and pilot with a 
standardized display and a simple operator action. 
  Provide operational modes for a set of predefined 
operational areas such as open sea, coastal, confined 
waters (pilotage, harbour berthing, and anchorage).  
S1.4 
(RCO 4)  
Automated and 
standardized 
ship-shore 
reporting 
Forms are usually manually filled out and sent individually to 
each authority requesting the information. Compliance with IMO 
FAL forms normally takes about two hours to fill. For example, 
around 25 documents had to be sent from the ship, or the ship's 
agent, in conjunction with a port call. The data requested in many 
of these documents are fully or almost identical. Documents are 
also often in paper or other non-computer-compatible formats, 
which is a time-consuming and costly affair. The S-mode 
provides followings in order to reduce workload due to filling 
out and delivering reportable information is identified. 
  
  The system would integrate relevant onboard systems 
enabling collection and edition of information and data 
needed for reporting.  
  The system should allow for automated digital 
distribution of required reportable information (single 
window solution), including both static, dynamic, 
voyage related and SAR information to authorized 
authorities, with the least possible intervention required 
by the ship during and/or before navigation.  
S2.1, S2.2, 
S2.3 and S2.4 
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(RCO 5)  
Improved 
reliability and 
resilience of 
onboard PNT 
systems 
Ensuring reliable and resilient PNT data, providing ship's 
position, velocity, and time data (PVT) for navigators and 
navigational functions, is important for safe navigation. However, 
for the time being, due to insufficient redundancy within single 
sensors and unsupported exploitation of multi-sensor based 
redundancy the classic approach is considered unable to meet e-
navigation user needs such as improvement of availability, 
reliability and indication of integrity based on monitored and 
assessed data and system integrity. 
 
In order to improve reliability and resilience of position, 
navigation, and timing data (PNT) an integrated and harmonized 
utilization of PNT related systems and services is envisioned. 
S3.4 
(RCO 6)  
Improved shore-
based services 
VTSs and other shore-based stakeholders gather and hold a lot of 
information regarding navigational warnings, incidents, 
operations, tide, AIS, traffic regulations, chart corrections, 
meteorological conditions, ice conditions, etc., which often is 
referred to as the Maritime Service Portfolio.  
 
As per today this information is mostly communicated via voice 
VHF and paper documents. Information transfer via voice 
communication can be time-consuming and distractive as 
navigators may need to make notes of information received and 
possibly consult various written documentation on the bridge. The 
voice communication procedure also holds a potential for 
incorrect transfer and misinterpretation of information. 
 
   Implementation of system for automatic and digital 
distribution of shore support services would make 
information more available, updated and applicable for 
navigators. 
  Maritime Safety Information (MSI) received by the ship 
should be applicable to the ship's specific voyage, i.e. it 
should not contain information related to other areas 
which is not relevant to that ship,  and be presented on 
one location, the ENC/ECDIS or AIS/RADAR display. 
   Notices to mariners, ENC updates and corrections to all 
nautical publications should be received electronically 
without any delays in the delivery.  
   All MSI to be sent out digitally and using a standard 
such as the IHO S-100 data framework standard 
enabling better visualization on board, for example, 
Virtual Aids to Navigation (AtoN) for warning of new 
S4.1.3 and 
solution S9 
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navigational hazards, such as wrecks, obstructions or 
floating debris, displaying on AIS/ECDIS  
   In addition automatic updating and correction of 
nautical charts via satellite is envisioned 
(RCO 7)  
Bridge and 
workstation 
layout 
standardization 
Cumbersome equipment layout on the bridge adversely influences 
the mariner's ability to optimally perform navigational duties. 
Therefore, regulation, based on existing guidelines and standards, 
regarding the physical layout of all bridge equipment regarded as 
essential for safe and efficient navigation, is envisaged to  
Workstation for navigating and maneuvering  including; 
 
   radar/radar plotting  
   ECDIS  
   information of AIS  
   Indications of: rudder angle, rate-of-turn, speed, gyro 
compass heading, compass heading and other relevant 
information  
   VHF point with channel selector  
S1.1 
 
Source: Summarized pages 20 to 31 of  NAV 59/6 Annex 1 
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3. METHODOLOGY TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF E-NAVIGATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is to identify the methodology to quantitatively evaluate the effects of  
SMART-navigation on reducing accidents for all ships in Korean waters and all Korean-
flagged ships worldwide during the 5 years from 2009 to 2013. 
 
With regard to this quantitative analysis, the author intends to apply same methodology  
used by the FSA team for the IMO e-navigation strategy in order to increase the 
objectivity of the study results. For that purpose, the methodology used by the FSA team 
is to be examined as to how it was developed and how the rate of reducing navigational 
accidents, "65 %", was calculated. 
 
3.2 Methodology used in the FSA for IMO e-navigation 
 
According to Annex 1 of NAV 59/6, the FSA team put several conditions in its  
methodology to estimate the risks and analyze the causes as follows:  
 
  to define a generic risk model (paragraph 3, page 4) 
  to select the ship types, excluding non-SOLAS ships (paragraph 3.3, page 5), 
  to limit accident categories of collision and grounding (paragraph 3.3, page 5).  
 
As the first step to quantify the rate of risk reduction of navigational accidents, the FSA 
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team calculated the frequencies for the accident categories as well as the potential loss of 
lives (PLL) as shown in Table 9 below, by combining the numbers of accidental events 
and losses of lives with the number of ship years for each ship category. The calculation 
was based on the direct cause distribution of accidents, including human errors, 
technical failures and external factors, as shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6, respectively (para. 
2.2.2).  
 
As a result, for example, for a generic ship, the distribution of accident types in terms of 
frequency per ship-year is 44 % for collisions and groundings, and 56 % for other 
accidents among all accidents per ship year as shown in Table 9 below.  
 
Table 9 Accident frequencies  
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (page 10) 
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According to the document NAV 59/6, the risks are summarized to estimate the 
individual risk and societal risks to crew members resulting from the operation of a 
generic ship, and the FSA team extracted the total potential loss of lives (PLL) as the 
risks by using a risk model "the frequency and consequence modeling" (para. 6.2, p. 16, 
Annex 1).  
 
The results of the risk estimation are presented in Table 10 below. For example, for a 
generic ship, the risk distribution of accident types in terms of the PLL is 22% per ship 
year for navigational accidents, including collisions and groundings, and 78 % for other 
accidents among all accidents. 
 
Table 10 Risk estimations  
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (p. 16)  
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For the purpose of producing an improved picture of where the highest risks originate, 
the FSA team distributed the above estimated risks among the probable accident causes 
as shown in Table 11 below, by applying findings from the hazard identification study 
(para. 6.3, p. 17,  Annex 1 of  NAV 59/6). 
 
Table 11 Total generic risk distributed among accident causes 
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (p. 18)  
 
Based on the results above, the rate of risk reduction, according to each direct cause of 
navigational accidents, by each RCO was estimated through a workshop composed of 5 
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experts from the USA, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, who had a total of over 190 
years of maritime experience (para. 8.3, p. 36, Annex 1 of NAV 59/6). The experts 
estimated the potential rate of risk reduction against the detailed direct causes reducible 
by RCOs, which are extracted among each direct cause, including human error, technical 
failure and external factor. The estimation was revised through panel discussion and 
refined by inputting the ideas of additional 4 experts after the workshop. Table 12 below 
shows the rate of risk reduction of navigational accidents by each RCO, according to 
each direct cause. 
 
Table 12 Risk reducing potential  
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (page 37)  
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As the next step, the FSA team estimated the potential reduction of PLL frequency by 
implementing each RCO as shown in Table 13 below. It was estimated by combining the 
PLL frequency of 2.1E-03 presented in Table 11 and the percentages of risk reductions 
given in Table 12 based on the cause distributions presented in Figures 4, 5 and 6.  
 
Table 13 Estimated reduction potential of PLL per ship 
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (p. 38)  
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Lastly, based on Table 13 above, the RCOs were ranked by their respective rate of risk 
reduction in terms of PLL reduction as shown in Table 14, and the rate of risk reduction 
is estimated as 65% in total. 
 
The FSA carried out cost-benefit (CB) analysis based on the above findings, resulting18 
in the conclusion that RCO 1, RCO 2, RCO 3, RCO 5, RCO 6 and RCO 7 are all 
beneficial in themselves in terms of economics; the costs of implementing the RCOs are 
less than the economic benefits of implementing them. 
 
Table 14 RCOs ranked by PLL  
Rank RCOs 
PLL 
reduction 
PLL reduction 
of total 
1 RCO 7 Bridge and workstation layout standardization 2.1E-04 14% 
2 RCO 1 
Integration of navigation information and equipment 
including improved software quality assurance 
1.7E-04 11% 
3 RCO 2 Bridge alert management 1.5E-04 10% 
4 RCO 4 Automated and standardized ship-shore reporting 1.3E-04 8% 
5 RCO 5 Improved reliability and resilience of on board PNT systems 1.2E-04 8% 
6 RCO 3 Standardized mode 1.1E-04 7% 
7 RCO 6 Improved shore-based services 1.1E-04 7% 
Total 65% 
 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (p. 37)  
 
3.3 Methodology to be used in the dissertation 
 
3.3.1 Conclusion of the methodology 
 
The author examined, in Chapter 2, IMO e-navigation tool kits functioning to reduce 
navigational accidents. As a result, the five e-navigation solutions, the seven RCOs and 
the 16 MSPs were identified as the tool kits. Based on the result, this chapter examined 
                                       
18   For details, see the document NAV 59/6. Annex 1 (page 42)  
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the methodology that the FSA team used to assess the effects of e-navigation on 
reducing accidents. Table 15 shows the results, summarizing the process of developing 
the methodology. As shown in Table 15, the rate of reducing accidents by each RCO is 
developed in the 4th step, whilst the other steps from the 1st step to the 3rd-2 step are to 
identify factors necessary for carrying out the cost-benefit analysis.  
 
With regard to rate of risk reduction, 65% in total, estimated by the FSA team as shown 
in Table 14, even though there is a limitation in the methodology to quantify the rate in a 
quantitative way, the author concluded that the rate is reasonable and feasible. It is 
because the rate has been developed based on reliable factors such as user needs, gap 
analysis, three kinds of tool kits of e-navigation, the analysis of navigational accidents,  
results of a generic risk model and verification by the competent experts through a 
workshop as shown in Table 15. The next paragraph 3.3.3 examines the limitations in 
more detail. 
 
Thus, based on the examination up to now, the author decided to use the rate of risk 
reduction by seven RCOs, 65%, which was estimated by the FSA team, as the 
coefficient to develop a formula for evaluating the effects of SMART-navigation on 
reducing accidents in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 15 Calculation process of risk reduction rate by the FSA team 
Steps  Founding  
Methods, 
Sources 
     
(1st) 
Identifying problems 
in terms of safety of 
navigation 
 
User Needs 
Direct Cause of Accidents, including human 
errors, technical failures and external factors 
 
Survey 
 
Analyze Statistics 
↓  ↓   
(2nd) 
Identifying tool kits 
 
Five e-Navigation Solutions  
 Seven RCOs, and 
. 
Experts opinions  
based on user 
needs and direct 
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of e-navigation to 
reduce risk 
 Sixteen MSPs cause of accidents 
↓  ↓   
(3rd - 1) 
Analyzing accidents 
Statistics 
 
Accident Trend (Table 4) 
Accident Types (Collision, Grounding, and 
Others) according to the ship's type  
IHS Statistics 
 
NMA Statistics Direct Cause (human error, technical failures and 
external factors); Figures 4,5 and 6 
↓  ↓   
(3rd - 2) 
Estimating Risks of 
Collisions and  
Groundings 
 
Accident frequency, PLL per ship year (Table 9) 
 
Based on the 
results of 
analyzing 
accident statistics 
 
In terms of PLL 
 
A generic risk 
model 
  
Frequency and 
consequence 
modeling 
↓ 
Risk estimations in terms of PLL  (Table 10) 
↓ 
Total generic risk distributed among accident 
causes (Table 11) 
↓ 
Risk reducing potential  (Table 12) 
↓ 
Estimated reduction potential of PLL per ship 
year (Table 13) 
↓ 
RCOs ranked by PLL reduction per ship year  
(Table 14) 
↓ ↓   
 
(4th) 
Estimating the effect 
of reducing risks 
 
Rate of reduction of accident by each RCO  
(Total : 65 % for SOLAS ships) 
 
Experts opinions 
& Frequency and 
consequence 
modeling 
 
Source: The author summarized process based on the examination results in paragraph 3.2 
 
3.3.2 Limitation in the methodology and Bayesian Network (BN) 
 
The document NAV 59/6. Annex 1 (p. 47) and MSC 83/INF.2. Annex (p. 4) defines 
"risk" as "the combination of the frequency and the severity of the consequence", 
"frequency" as "the number of occurrences per unit time", and "consequence" as "the 
outcome of an accident". These definitions are similar to those of the American Bureau 
of Shipping (ABS). The ABS (2000) defines "risk" as "the product of the frequency with 
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which an event is anticipated to occur and the consequence of the event’s outcome: Risk 
= Frequency × Consequence". 
 
Therefore, the rate of risk reduction of accidents by implementing e-navigation might be 
the same as the rate of reducing frequency or probability. For example, Dr. Jens 
Schröder-Hinrichs, who is a professor of the World Maritime University (WMU), 
explained "risk" as the product of the probability with which an event is anticipated to 
occur and the consequence of the event’s outcome; Risk = Probability × Consequence, 
and "probability" as the average number of events, divided by time unit or other 
adequate basis, during his lecture about risk equations in the common reliability 
engineering approaches (class notes, February 6, 2015).  
 
However, it is not easy to actually measure this rate because of the limitation of taking 
into account the same situation with and without the tool kits of e-navigation. For 
example, the Danish Maritime Authority (DMA) and the Royal Danish Administration 
of Navigation and Hydrography (RDANH) carried out a risk analysis of navigational 
safety in Danish waters in 2002. The report commented that "the risk reduction factor as 
the effects of implementing the selected RCOs, including VTS, AIS and ECDIS, by the 
expected number of spills after implementation of the RCOs, divided by the number of 
expected spills before implementation of the RCOs" (p. 8, DMA & RDANH, 2002). 
 
Like the above case, because of similar limitations, the coefficient as the rate of risk 
reduction, which was estimated by the FSA team, was quantified in a qualitative way by 
experts through a workshop as described in paragraph 3.2. With regard to this, the IMO 
document MSC 83/INF.2. Annex also guides that "Quantification makes use of accident 
and failure data and other sources of information as appropriate to the level of analysis. 
Where data is unavailable, calculation, simulation or the use of recognized techniques 
for expert judgement may be used" (para. 6.2.2). 
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However, even though it is difficult to quantify the coefficient, it should be noted that 
the coefficient acts as the most important factor to quantitatively evaluate the effects of 
e-navigation on reducing accidents according to each detailed direct cause of the vessel 
accident.  
 
Therefore, further investigation in quantifying the coefficient by a quantitative 
methodology might be necessary in order to provide a more reliable rate of reducing 
accidents by implementing e-navigation. In other words, the coefficient needs to be 
quantified based on a more quantitative relationship between accident types and  
detailed direct causes as well as the relationship between the RCOs and their rate of risk 
reduction. With regard to this, the Bayesian Network (BN) might be a tool to quantify 
the coefficient.  
 
For example, Li, Yin, Yang and Wang (2011)19 introduced the BN, in their research 
"The Effect of Shipowners’ Effort in Vessels Accident: A Bayesian Network Approach", 
as "By taking into account different actors (i.e. age, size, etc.) and their mutual 
influences, maritime risk assessment using the BN enables to identify the factors that 
have the greatest impact on the accident occurrence" (p. 352, Chapter 5).  
 
Besides the above case, there have recently been many cases to apply the use of BN as a 
tool for modeling and analyzing vessel accidents, for example, "Analysis of Loss of 
Position Incidents for Dynamically Operated Vessels" (Stenvågnes Hauff, 2014), and 
"An Analysis on Incident Cases of Dynamic Positioning Vessels" (Chae & Jung, 2015). 
Further, the FSA guideline, MSC 83/INF.2. Annex, also recommends BN as one of the 
methods that could be used, if appropriate (p. 9). 
                                       
19   With regard to calculation of the probability of accident, Li et al. (2011) criticized that "Traditional 
and the most common way to estimate the prior probability of accidents is by expert estimation. There 
are some typical problems associated with using the subjective probability, provided by expert, as a 
measure of uncertainty in risk analysis" (p.337, Abstract). 
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4. ANALYSIS OF KOREAN-RELATED ACCIDENTS (2009-2013) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes the Korean investigation statistical accidents data20 for all ships in 
Korean water areas and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide over the period of 2009 to 
2013; this data having been collected from the KMST. The analysis is based on the 
following: 
 
  The trend of accident' volume according to the accident types 
  The types of accidents with direct causes according to each ship's category;   
SOLAS ships and non-SOLAS, non-fishing vessels and fishing vessels 
     -  Accident types : collisions and groundings, and others 
  The direct causes ; human errors, technical failures and external factors 
  The statistics are analyzed by number of vessels, not in number of events.  
 
                                       
20  There have been two kinds of statistics related to marine accidents; one of them is the statistics 
provided by the KMST that are mainly based on vessel accidents, and the other one is the statistics 
provided by the Korean Coast Guard that are mainly based on their rescue activities. Because of the 
difference in the scope and purpose of producing the statistics between these two organizations, there 
have been differences in the figures of their statistics respectively, causing some confusion to the 
public in Korea because both statistics are seemed to be very similar each other to the common people. 
Because of this, KMST had began to produce the incorporated statistics  combining the both statistics 
of from 2008 since 2014, while the former statistics that KMST had been producing  until 2013 were 
kept left. For the purpose of focusing on the vessel accident oriented data, this paper is to analyze the 
statistics produced by KMST, which were produced based on the marine accident investigation code of 
IMO. 
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With regard to the scope of a ship's type, unlike the ones used by the FSA team, the 
author includes all kinds of ships involved in accidents in Korean waters and all Korean-
flagged ships worldwide. It is because the scope of SMART -navigation services 
includes non-SOLAS ships that are engaged in domestic coastal areas, and fishing 
vessels as well as SOLAS ships.  
 
Thus, the author analyzes the effect of SMART-navigation on reducing all kinds of 
accidents, unlike the IMO's e-navigation analysis, which is limited to navigational 
accidents, including collisions and groundings, of SOLAS ships. With regard to the 
ship's type, as shown in Table 16 below, the author categorized all ships into 2 groups, 
non-fishing vessels and fishing vessels, and 6 sub-groups under the 2 groups. The group 
of non-fishing vessels includes cargo ships, tankers, passenger ships, towing ships, and 
others. 
 
Table 16  Ship types included in the dataset  
Group of Ship Type 
Sub-Group of Ship Type 
Ship's Type included Size 
Non-
fishing 
vessels 
Cargo ships 
All ships, which are not included in the ships below, 
including general cargo carrying ships, semi-
container ships, coal carrying ships, car carriers, 
refrigerated cargo ships, chilled carriers, etc 
All ships 
regardless of 
size, including 
SOLAS and 
not-SOLAS 
ships 
Tanker 
Dangerous cargo carriers, LPG and LNG carriers, 
Chemical Tankers, Product Oil carriers, etc. 
Passenger 
ships 
Car-ferries, Cargo-Passenger carriers, and other 
ferries and passenger ships 
Towing ships All kinds of  tugs and towing ships 
Other ships Barges, dredging ships, leisure boats, yachts, etc 
Fishing vessels All kinds of fishing vessels 
 
Source: Categorized based on the descriptions of KMST investigation statistics (2014) 
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4.2 Analyzing accidents 
 
4.2.1 Historical trends of accident volume 
 
Figure 8 and Table 17 below show the historical trends of vessel accidents based on the 
KMST investigation statistics during the last 5 years from 2009 to 2013. The total 
number of annual accidents during the last 5 years shows a rising trend until 2011, but 
decreasing trend after that as shown in Figure 8. However, over the period from 2009 to 
2013, non-fishing vessel accidents have a rising trend in general, while fishing vessel 
accidents have a decreasing trend  in general even though there was a fluctuation in 2011 
due to the rapid rise in collisions as shown in Table 18. 
 
Table 17 Historical trend of accidents by ship's type  
Ship Type 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sum 
Non-
Fishing 
vessel 
Cargo 89 105 99 89 88 470 (9.6%) 
Tanker 20 42 37 43 44 186 (3.8%) 
Passenger 9 18 19 26 20 92 (1.9%) 
Towing 61 117 126 122 80 506 (10.4%) 
Others 20 13 38 35 30 136 (2.8%) 
Total 199 295 319 315 262 1390 (28.5%) 
Fishing 742 680 890 647 522 3481 (71.5%) 
Total 941 975 1209 962 784 4871 (100%) 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
 
Figure 8 Historical trend of accidents by ship's type  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
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4.2.2 Historical trend of accident types 
 
Table 18 and Figure 9 show the ratio of categorized types of accidents according to ship 
type by percentage, for all ships in Korean water areas and all Korean-flagged ships 
worldwide from 2009 to 2013. 64.1% of non-fishing vessel accidents involved  
navigational accidents, including collisions and groundings. In more detail, 37.2% of 
SOLAS ship accidents and 26.9% of non-SOLAS ship accidents were navigational 
accidents. The figure for SOLAS ship navigational accidents, 37.2%, is 6% lower than 
NMA's statistics, 43.2%.  
 
However, in the case of calculating all accidents by both SOAS and non-SOLAS ships, 
more than 43.5 % were involved in navigational accidents, including 18.3% for non-
fishing vessels and 25.1% for fishing vessels. This figure is similar to the statistic, 
43.2% that the FSA team obtained based on IHS Fairplay. 
 
Table 18 Accident type distribution  
Accident Ship Type 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sum 
Collision 
Non-Fishing 122 172 173 168 121 
756 
(15.5%) 
Fishing 224 205 269 174 168 
1040 
(21.4%) 
Subtotal 346 377 442 342 289 
1796 
(36.9%) 
Grounding 
Non-Fishing 21 33 26 24 31 
135 
(2.8%) 
Fishing 27 36 46 38 40 
187 
(3.8%) 
Subtotal 48 69 72 62 71 
322 
(6.6%) 
Navigationa
l Accidents 
Non-Fishing 143 205 199 192 152 891 
(18.3%) 
Fishing 251 241 315 212 208 
1227 
(25.2%) 
Subtotal 394 446 514 404 360 
2118 
(43.5%) 
Other Non-Fishing 56 90 120 123 110 499 
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(10.2%) 
Fishing 491 439 575 435 314 
2254 
(42.3%) 
Subtotal 547 529 695 558 424 
2753 
(56.5%) 
Total 
Non-Fishing 199 295 319 315 262 
1390 
(28.5%) 
Fishing 742 680 890 647 522 3481 
(71.5%) 
Total 941 957 1209 962 784 4871 
(100%) 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
  
Figure 9 Accident type distribution (2009-2013)  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
4.2.3 Direct causes of accidents 
 
This study analyzed the distribution of accident causes based on the methodology 
performed by KMST as shown in Figure 10: (1) the accidents are listed; (2) the direct 
causes are identified; and (3) the root causes are identified.  
 
The KMST statistics classify the accident causes into five groups, including human error, 
technical failure, external factors, inadequate handling of machinery and cargo, and 
others as shown in Table 19. 
Non-Fishing and Fishing 
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Figure 10 Methodology to identify the direct causes of accidents  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
Table 19 and Figure 11 demonstrate that most of the navigational accidents were caused 
by human error: 90.7 % of all navigational accidents (collisions and groundings) were 
caused by human error, and also 35.1 % of other accidents were caused by human error. 
The percentage for navigational accidents is greater than the one from NMA statistics, 
65%, meaning that there would be more possibilities to reduce accidents caused by 
human error in the case of Korea. 
 
Table 19 Direct cause distribution by accident type  
Direct Causes 
Navigational Accidents 
Others Sum 
Grounding Collision Sum 
Human Errors 
273 
(84.8%) 
1647 
(91.7%) 
1920 
(90.7%) 
965 
(35.1%) 
2885 
(59.2%) 
Inadequate Handling machineries or 
cargos 
4 7 11 1236 
1247 
(25.6%) 
Technical Failures 1 2 3 175 
178 
(3.7%) 
External Factors 
 
41 41 19 60 (1.2%) 
Others 44 113 157 355 
512 
(10.5%) 
Total 
322  
(100%) 
1796  
(100%) 
2118 
(100%) 
2753  
(100%) 
4871 
(100%) 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
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Figure 11 Direct cause distribution by accident type (2009-2013) 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
Table 20 shows the distribution of direct causes in more detail: 88.1% among the 
navigational accidents of non-fishing vessels and 92.0% of fishing vessel accidetns were 
caused by human error. These figures are higher than the one from NMA statistics, 
65%21.  However, in the case of calculating all kinds of accidents, including navigational 
accidents and others involving all kinds of ship types, 59.2% were caused by human 
error. This figure is more similar to the statistic, 65% that the FSA team obtained based 
on IHS Fairplay.  
 
Table 20 Direct cause distribution  
Direct 
Cause 
Non-Fishing Fishing Vessels 
Total Navigational Accident Non-
Nav. 
Sub-
Total 
Navigational Accident Non-
Navi 
Sub-
Total Coll Gro Sum Grou Colli Sum 
Human 
Error 
681 
(90.1) 
104 
(77.0) 
785 
(88.1) 
255 
(51.1) 
1040 
(74.8) 
169 
(90.4) 
966 
(92.9) 
1135 
(92) 
710 
(31.8) 
1845 
(53) 
2885 
(59.2) 
Technical 
Failure 
2 
 
2 43 45 1 
 
1 132 133 178 
Inadequate 
Handling 
3 3 6 114 120 1 4 5 
1122 
(49.8) 
1127 1247 
External 
Factors 
25 
 
25 7 32 
 
16 16 12 28 60 
Others 45 28 72 80 152 16 60 76 272 348 501 
Total 
756 
(100) 
135 
(100) 
891 
(100) 
499 
(100) 
1390 
(100) 
187 
(100) 
1040 
(100) 
1227 
(100) 
2254 
(100) 
3481 
(100) 
4871 
(100) 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
                                       
21   see Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (p. 14) 
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Table 21, and Figures 12 and 13 show the distribution of detailed causes of human errors 
in the case of navigational accidents. Among them, "Inadequate observation" (70.4%), 
"Inadequate ship maneuvering" (8.0%), "Inadequate actions to avoid collision" (8.0%), 
and "Inadequate positioning" (5.2%) are shown as the most significant causes for human 
errors.   
 
Table 21 Human error cause distribution  
Human error 
Non-Fishing Vessel Fishing Vessel 
Total Navigational Accident Non
-
Navi 
Sub-
Total 
Navigational Accident 
Non
-
Navi 
Sub-
Total Colli
sion 
Groun
ding Sum 
Colli
sion 
Gro
undi
ng 
Sum 
Inadequate 
observation 
531 
(78.0) 
22 
(21.5) 
553 
(70.4) 
42 
(16.5) 
595 
(57.2) 
815 
(84.4) 
49 
(29.0) 
864 
(76.1) 
357 
(50.3) 
1221 
(66.2) 
1816 
(62.9) 
Over loading 
   
1 1 
   
3 3 4 
Failure to 
equipments         
3 3 3 
Other 
Navigational 
failure 
19 
(2.8) 
5 
(4.8) 
24 
(3.1) 
38 
(14.9) 
62 
(6.0) 
10 
(1.0) 
11 
(6.5) 
21 
(1.9) 
165 
(23.2) 
186 
(10.1) 
248 
(8.6) 
Negligence of 
duty 
4 
(0.6) 
5 
(4.8) 
9 
(1.1) 
2 
(1.3) 
11 
(1.1) 
7 
(0.7) 
4 
(2.4) 
11 
(1.0) 
1 
(0.1) 
12 
(0.7) 
23 
(0.8) 
Pilot 
error/violations 
5 
 
5 
(0.6) 
7 12 
     
12 
Inadequate 
Anchoring 
1 2 
3 
(0.4) 
1 4 
   
3 3 7 
Inadequate safety 
management 
1 1 
2 
(0.3) 
1 3 
   
4 4 7 
Not observing 
safety manual on 
board 
1 
(0.1)  
1 
(0.2) 
70 
(27.5) 
71 
(6.8)  
1 
(0.6) 
1 
(0.1) 
93 
(13.1) 
94 
(5.1) 
165 
(5.7) 
Inadequate 
positioning  
41 
(39.4) 
41 
(5.2) 
16 
57 
(5.5) 
1 
(0.1) 
90 
(53.
5) 
91 
(8.0) 
15 
(2.1) 
106 
(5.7) 
163 
(5.6) 
Inadequate 
Maneuvering 
52 
(7.6) 
11 
(10.6) 
63 
(8.0) 
45 
(17.6) 
108 
(10.4) 
17 
(1.8) 
4 
(2.4) 
21 
(1.9) 
34 
(4.8) 
55 
(3.0) 
163 
(5.6) 
Inadequate 
departure 
preparing 
   
2 2 
   
1 1 3 
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Inadequate actions 
to avoid collision 
63 
(9.3)  
63 
(8.0)  
63 
(6.1) 
96 
(9.9)  
96 
(8.5)  
96 
(5.2) 
159 
(5.5) 
Inadequate Course 
plan and keeping 
2 
(0.3) 
1 
(1.0) 
3 
(0.4) 
3 
(1.2) 
6 
(0.6) 
1 
(0.1) 
1 
(0.6) 
2 
(0.2) 
1 
(0.1) 
3 
(0.2) 
9 
(0.3) 
Violation of 
COREG      
7 1 
8 
(0.7)  
8 
8 
(0.3) 
Lack of sailing 
plan  
2 
2 
(0.3) 
1 3 
 
1 
1 
(0.1) 
1 2 
5 
(0.2) 
Lack of preparing 
heavy weather 
2 
(0.3) 
13 
(12,5) 
15 
(1.9) 
19 
(7.5) 
34 
(3.4) 
6 
(0.6) 
7 
(4.1) 
13 
(1.1) 
29 
(4.1) 
42 
(2.3) 
76 
(2.6) 
Inadequate 
Management  
1 
1 
(0.2) 
7 8 6 
 
6 
(0.5)  
6 
14 
(0.5) 
Total 681 104 785 255 1040 966 169 1135 710 1845 2885 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
  
Figure 12 Human error cause distribution of navigational accidents  
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
Non-Fishing Vessels & Fishing Vessels 
Non-Fishing Vessels 
Fishing Vessels 
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Figure 13 Human error cause distribution of all accidents  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
Table 22 and Figure 14 show the distribution of detailed causes of technical failures, 
showing that few navigational accidents are caused by these causes; 1.1% for non-
fishing vessels and 0.6% for fishing vessels. Totally, for all kinds of ships and accidents, 
"Electronic facility deficiency" (38.8%), "Other machinery deficiency" (14.5%), "Main 
Engine trouble" (14.0%), and "Deficiency in closing" (5.2%) are shown as the most 
significant causes of technical failures. 
 
Table 22 Technical failure cause distribution  
Technical Failures 
Non-Fishing Vessels Fishing Vessel 
Total 
(%) 
Navigational 
Accident Non-
Navi. 
Sub-
Total 
Navigational 
Accident Non-
Navi. 
Sub-
Total 
Col Gro sum Col Gro sum 
Other machinery 
deficiency    
8 8 
   
18 18 
26 
(14.5) 
Fatigue of Hull 
   
12 12 
   
10 10 
22 
(12.4) 
Electronic facility 
   
8 8 
   
61 61 69 
Total 
 
 Non-Fishing Vessels 
 Fishing Vessels 
 Others 
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deficiency (38.8) 
Steering gear 
related deficiency         
4 4 
4 
(2.2) 
Auxiliary 
machinery 
deficiency 
   
1 1 
   
7 7 
8 
(4.5) 
Main Engine 
trouble 
2 
 
2 2 4 
   
21 21 
25 
(14.0) 
Deficiency in 
closing    
10 10 
   
10 10 
20 
(11.2) 
Loading/Unloading 
facility deficiency    
2 2 
     
2 
(1.1) 
Deficiency of Nav. 
equipments       
1 1 1 2 
2 
(1.1) 
Total 2 
 
2 
(1.1) 
43 
(24.1) 
45 
(25.2)  
1 
(0.6) 
1 
(0.6) 
132 
(74.2) 
133 
(74.7) 
178 
(100) 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014). Unit of figures in blank:  % 
 
  
Figure 14 Technical failure cause distribution  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
Table 23 and Figure 15 show the distribution of detailed causes of external factors, 
revealing that "Other ship's errors" (85%) is the most significant cause. This cause was 
accounted for 100% of navigational accidents among non-fishing vessels, and 68.3% of 
navigational accidents among total accidents.  
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With regard to external factors, the cause "Other ship's errors" could be argued as being 
a human error cause. Adding it to the human error category brings the share of human 
error up to 90.9% for navigational accidents of non-fishing vessels, 93.3% for 
navigational accidents involving fishing vessels, and 60.2%  for all kinds of accidents 
involving both types of vessels. 
 
Table 23 External factors distribution 
External 
Factors 
Non-Fishing Vessels Fishing  Vessels 
Total Navigational 
Accident 
Non
-
Nav 
Sub-
Total 
Navigational 
Accident 
Non
-
Nav 
Sub-
Total 
Col Gro sum Col Gro sum 
Other ship's 
errors 
25 
 
25 
 
25 16 
 
16 10 26 
51 
(85%) 
Deficiency 
of shore 
facilities 
   
7 7 
   
1 1 
8 
(13.3%) 
Deficiency 
of AtoN 
facility 
        
1 1 
1 
(1.7%) 
Total 25 
 
25 7 32 16 
 
16 12 28 60 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
  
Figure 15 External factors distribution  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
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Table 24 and Figure 16 show the distribution of detailed causes for the inadequate 
handling of machinery or cargo, showing that "Lack of Engine Maintenance" (83.4%) is 
the most significant cause. In more detail, the cause distribution of "Lack of Engine 
Maintenance" was 63.1% among navigational accidents involving non-fishing vessels 
and 80% among navigational accident involving fishing vessels.  
 
Other significant causes in this category were "Lack of Maintenance of 
steering/navigational gears" (8.4%), "Inadequate Fire machinery" (3.7%) and "Lack of 
checking fuel oil, lubrication oil" (2.0%). 
 
Table 24 Inadequate handling machinery or cargo cause distribution 
Inadequate 
Handling 
Non-Fishing Vessels Fishing Vessels 
Total Navigational Accident 
Non-
Nav Sub-
Total 
Navigational 
Accident 
Non-Nav Sub-
Total 
Col Gra sum Other Col Gra Sum Other 
Lack of Eng. 
Maintenance 
3 
(100) 
3 
(100) 
6 
(100) 
72 
(63.1) 
78 
(65) 
3 
(75) 
1 
(100) 
4 
(80) 
958 
(85.4) 
962 
(85.4) 
1040 
(83.4) 
Lack of checking 
fuel oil, lubrication 
oil    
7 7 1 
 
1 17 18 
25 
(2.0) 
Inadequate handling 
dangerous cargo    
3 3 
   
1 1 4 
Self-ignition 
   
1 1 
   
4 4 5 
Inadequate 
Handling cargo    
3 3 
   
5 5 8 
Lack of 
Maintenance of 
steering/nav.gears    
9 9 
   
96 96 
105 
(8.4) 
Inadequate Fire 
machinery    
9 9 
   
37 37 
46 
(3.7) 
Inadequate Loading 
Cargo    
5 5 
   
2 2 7 
Explosion of cargo 
   
4 4 
     
4 
Cargo shifted 
   
1 1 
   
2 2 3 
Total 
3 
(100) 
3 
(100) 
6 
(100) 
114 
(100) 
120 
(100) 
4 
(100) 
1 
(100) 
5 
(100) 
1122 
(100) 
1127 
(100) 
1247 
(100) 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
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Figure 16 Inadequate handling machinery or cargo cause distribution  
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
 
Table 25 shows the distribution of detailed causes for other factors, showing two kinds 
of causes: 75.4 % of  irresistible causes such as natural disasters and typhoons, and 
24.6% of the unknown and others. The "unknown" and "others" are 7.8% among the 
total number of accidents. The direct cause "others" could also be argued as being a 
human error because it is composed of inadequate management of a ship's operation and 
inadequate loading of cargo or passengers according to the KMST's descriptions. 
 
Table 25 Other Factors Distribution (Korea related) 
Others 
Non-Fishing Vessels Fishing  Vessels 
Total Navi. Accident 
Other sum 
Navi. Accident 
Other sum 
Col Gro sum Col Gro sum 
Other 14 
(31.1) 
5 
(17.9) 
19 
(26.0) 
46 
(57.5) 
65 
(42.5) 
18 
(30) 
3 
(18.8) 
21 
(27.6) 
123 
(45.2) 
144 
(41.4) 
209 
(41.7) 
Unknown 25 
(55.6) 
5 
(17.9) 
30 
(41.1) 
18 
(22.5) 
48 
(31.4) 
41 
(68.3) 
1 
(6.3) 
42 
(55.3) 
79 
(29.0) 
121 
(34.8) 
169 
(33.7) 
irresistible 
natural disasters  
6 
(21.4) 
6 
(8.2) 
4 
(5.0) 
10 
(6.5)  
7 
(43.8) 
7 
(9.2) 
47 
(17.3) 
54 
(15.5) 
64 
(12.8) 
typhoon 6 
(13.1) 
12 
(42.9) 
18 
(24.7) 
12 
(15.0) 
30 
(19.6) 
1 
(1.7) 
5 
(31.3) 
6 
(7.9) 
23 
(8.5) 
29 
(8.3) 
59 
(11.8) 
Total 45 
(100) 
28 
(100) 
73 
(100) 
80 
(100) 
153 
(100) 
60 
(100) 
16 
(100) 
76 
(100) 
272 
(100) 
348 
(100) 
501 
(100) 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base 
 62 
 
 
 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECTS OF E-NAVIGATION 
 
5.1 Development of the formula to evaluate the effects of e-navigation 
 
The author, in Chapters 2 and 3, examined the IMO's e-navigation related documents, 
and especially the SIP set out in NCSR 1/28. Annex 7 in order to determine the 
methodology to discuss the effects of SMART-navigation on reducing accidents. As a 
result, the author determined the rate of risk reduction of "65%" that the FSA team 
calculated through a generic risk model and an expert workshop, as the coefficient to 
calculate the effects of SMART-navigation as described in Chapter 3. 
 
However, the rate of the risk reduction of "65%" does not mean the rate to reduce the 
volume of accidents, but the rate to reduce the percentage of each detailed direct cause 
reducible by RCOs, which is extracted from each direct cause, in terms of the potential 
loss of lives (PLL) as described in Tables 13 and 14 in Chapter 3.  
 
This means that the rate of "65%" should be converted into the actual rate of risk 
reduction by RCOs for each direct cause as well as the total actual rate of risk reduction 
to be reduced by RCOs for all direct cause in order to calculate the actual volume of 
selected accidents to be reduced by RCOs in terms of percentage among total accidents. 
 
Thus, the author developed the following formulas in order to calculate the effects of 
SMART-navigation on reducing accidents in terms of the actual volume of the relevant 
accidents by RCOs: 
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 AVSA = ∑(RSADⅹ ARDCHF/TF/EF) 
  = ∑(RSADⅹcⅹ∑RDDCHF/TF/EF)  
  = cⅹ∑(RSADⅹ∑RDDCHF/TF/EF) 
 
 where is : 
 c   = Coefficient (65% for SOLAS ships, 55% for non-SOLAS ships) 
 AVSA  = Actual Volume of selected accidents to be reduced in terms of percentage  
                                              among  total accidents 
 RSAD  = Rate of selected accident distribution 
 ARDC  = Actual Rate of risk reduction of each direct cause to be reduced 
 RDDC HE = Rate of risk reduction of detailed direct cause of Human Error to be reduced  
 RDDC TF = Rate of risk reduction of each detailed direct cause of Technical Failure to be  
                                               reduced  
 RDDC EF = Rate of risk reduction of each detailed direct cause of External Factor to be  
                                               reduced  
 
In more detail, the above formulas are explained as follows : 
 
  the actual rate of risk reduction to be reduced by RCOs for each direct cause 
(ARDC) = the coefficient (65%)ⅹ ∑(each percentage of the detailed direct 
causes of relevant direct cause to be reduced by RCOs) 
 
 the total actual rate of risk reduction to be reduced by RCOs for all direct cause 
(Total ARDC)  = ∑(the percentage of each direct cause among total direct cause 
ⅹ each actual rate of risk reduction to be reduced by RCOs for relevant direct 
cause) = ∑(the percentage of each direct cause among total direct cause ⅹ ((the                  
coefficient (65%))ⅹ ∑(each percentage of the detailed direct causes of relevant  
direct cause))) 
 
 the actual volume of selected accidents to be reduced by RCOs in terms of 
percentage among total accidents  
            = the percentage distribution of the selected accidents among total accidents ⅹ                 
total actual rate of risk reduction to be reduced by RCOs for all direct cause 
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= the percentage distribution of the selected accidents among total accidents ⅹ   
∑(the percentage 22  of each direct cause among total direct cause ⅹ ((the   
coefficient (65%))ⅹ ∑23(each percentage of the detailed direct causes of each   
direct cause))) 
 
For example, in the case of the NMA investigation statistics that were used in the FSA, 
the actual volume of navigational accidents, including collisions and groundings, to be 
reduced by RCOs in terms of percentage among total accidents is calculated as 22.8% by 
applying the above formula as follows: 
 
  43.2% 24  (the percentage distribution of navigational accidents among total 
accidents) ⅹ ∑(65% (the percentage of human error) ⅹ 61.1% ((the 
coefficient (65%) ⅹ ∑(the percentage of the detailed direct causes of the human 
error to be reduced by RCOs)) + 18% (the  percentage of  technical failures) ⅹ 
53.3% ((the coefficient (65%)ⅹ ∑(the percentage of the detailed direct causes 
of the technical failures to be reduced by RCOs)) + 17% (the  percentage of 
external factors) ⅹ 19.5% ((the coefficient (65%)ⅹ ∑(the percentage of the 
detailed direct causes of the external factors to be reduced by RCOs))) = 43.2% 
ⅹ ∑((65% ⅹ61.1%)+(18%ⅹ53.3%)+(17%ⅹ19.5%)) = 43.2%ⅹ52.6% = 
22.8% 
 
                                       
22  The percentage of each direct cause among total direct cause : 65% for the human error, 18% for the 
technical failures and 17% for the external factors,  respectively (see Table 29 in paragraph 5.3.4.1). 
 
23   Each percentage of the detailed direct causes of each direct cause to be reduced by RCOs is 94% for 
the human error, 82% for the technical failures and 30% for the external factors, respectively (see 
Table 29 in paragraph 5.3.4.1). 
 
24   see Table 3 in the paragraph 2.2.2 
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For the purpose of applying the above formula to non-SOLAS ships, this chapter 
overviews SMART-navigation, which focuses on the services for non-SOLAS ships as 
well as SOLAS ships as mentioned in the paragraph 1.1. The RCOs that are applicable 
to non-SOLAS ships, including fishing vessels, are to be identified. Further, the author 
discusses the effects of SMART-navigation on reducing accidents based on the results of 
calculations by applying the above formula.  
 
5.2 The SMART-navigation concept 
 
5.2.1 Background of SMART-navigation 
 
The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) established the SMART-navigation 
strategy to implement IMO's e-navigation concept in 2013, and finished the feasibility 
study on developing necessary core technologies and infrastructures to implement the 
strategy in 2014. The project to implement the strategy has been undertaken sparsely. 
 
SMART-navigation is the Korean approach to implementing the IMO e-navigation 
concept in both Korean waters and Korean-related ships. Beside the scope of IMO e-
navigation, SMART-navigation even includes services for non-SOLAS ships, including 
fishing vessels as well as non-fishing vessels engaging in domestic coastal areas.  
 
The strategic implementation plan for SMART-navigation was basically composed of 16 
kinds of MSPs as adopted in the IMO's SIP. Non-SOLAS ship are more vulnerable25  to 
accidents than SOLAS ships. This is, among others, because of lack of capacity of 
navigational equipment, higher workload on board and less safety information provided 
                                       
25  According to the preliminary feasibility study to implement the IMO e-Navigation (MOF, 2014), 
89.04% among all accidents for all ships in Korean waters and all Korean-flagged ships during last 5 
years from 2009 to 2013  happened to non-SOLAS ships, while 10.06%  were SOLAS ships (p. 5-44) 
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by shore based stations. Consequently, SMART-navigation concept even provides the 
much more enhanced services for non-SOLAS ships. 
 
5.2.2 Components of the SMART-navigation 
 
5.2.2.1 Main services of the SMART-navigation 
 
According to the preliminary feasibility study on implementing IMO's e-navigation 
(MOF, 2014), the strategy of this project was developed through the following steps: (1) 
identifying the user needs of all stake-holders; (2) a gap analysis; (3) analyzing the direct 
causes of accidents; (4) identifying target services based on the results of the former 
steps; and (5) a risk and cost-benefit analysis. In addition to the  study, the MOF 
conducted "A fundamental study on maritime accident prevention systems" and 
completed the definition of the main services of the SMART-navigation as summarized 
in Table 26: 
 
Table 26 Main services of the SMART-navigation  
Service Groups and its concept Main Functions 
Relevant 
MSPs 
<Intelligent traffic coordination> 
 
The Services to increase the safety 
and efficiency of vessel traffics by 
using safety information, which is 
based on CMDS, to the vessel traffic 
management and coordination 
 
 Providing VTS information to ship : other 
ships' position, destination, and intention of 
movement; any changes in safety 
information of the VTS areas 
 Monitoring the ship's routing plan 
 Supporting navigation decision-making 
 Organizing vessel traffic 
 Providing port information : local port; pilot-
age, berthing and un-berthing 
- MSP 1 
- MSP 2 
- MSP 3 
<Automation of maritime 
information> 
 
Serve to increase the efficiency of 
maritime related businesses as well 
as the safety of navigation by 
 Maritime safety information (MSI) service 
 Safety fishing related information service 
 Pilot-age  information service 
 Single window service for automatic 
reporting to shore for decreasing crews' 
unnecessary work burden and making them 
- MSP 4 
- MSP 5 
- MSP 6 
- MSP 7 
- MSP 8 
- MSP11 
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improving their efficiencies through 
automation of creating, delivering, 
utilizing and inter-connecting the 
maritime information. 
focus on safety of navigation 
 Transferring nautical charts and nautical 
publications for supporting automatic up-
dating them electronically 
 Meteorological information service for 
safety navigation and fishing activities 
 Real-time hydrographic and environmental 
information service 
- MSP12 
- MSP14 
- MSP15 
<Pro-active management of the  
maritime safety> 
 
Service to prevent the potential  
accident causes in advance by  
proactively managing  the ships and 
areas, which are identified as being 
vulnerable to accidents based on 
utilizing the real time of relevant 
statistics and local situation data 
 Managing ships and areas, which are 
identified as being vulnerable to accident, in 
timely manner, based on real-time statistics 
and information 
 Supporting safety navigation decision-
making for their proactive responding to 
avoid accidents  
 Analyzing maritime safety factors based on 
Big-data 
 Providing safety information to ships, which 
are vulnerable to accidents, and supporting 
their safety decision-making 
 Providing service of streaming electronic 
navigational charts (ENCs)  to ships of 
medium and small size 
 Remote supporting and managing safety 
training crews 
Korean 
version 
of  
special 
services 
for non-
SOLAS 
ships 
<Remote/rapid emergency assistance > 
 
Service to minimize loss of lives and 
properties from accidents and 
variable emergencies happened in 
remote water areas by prompt and 
comprehensive responding to them 
 Remote telemedical assistance in order to 
prevent delaying in remedial treatment 
 Assisting ships' emergency responding 
 Supporting SAR operation 
 Supporting maritime affairs, regarding MAS 
 Assisting remote crews' training to increase 
their competences 
- MSP9 
- MSP10 
- MSP16 
<Maritime domain awareness> 
 
Service to increase maritime security 
by real-time monitoring and 
managing all maritime domains in 
Korean water areas 
 Comprehensive recognizing and responding 
to all maritime domains over all Korean 
water areas 
 Providing information regarding the illegal 
unreported unregulated fishing activities 
 Providing information regarding oil spill 
 Supporting activities preventing illegal 
discharge of wastes/pollutants from ships 
 Supporting the other activities related to 
maritime security 
Korean 
version 
of 
service 
Source: A fundamental study on maritime accident prevention systems (pages 162-163, MOF, 2015) 
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5.2.2.2 SMART-navigation Services for non-SOLAS ships 
  
According to Table 26, SMART-navigation will introduce more enhanced special 
services26 for non-SOLAS ships, which are designed as SMART-phone like services for 
examples: (1) the service supporting ship's routing for ships vulnerable to accidents such 
as coastal ferries and dangerous cargo carriers as shown in Figure 17; (2) the service 
supporting the safety of fishing vessels; (3) the electronic navigation chart (ENC) 
streaming service for small coastal ships; (4) and the single window service.  
 
  
Figure 17 Concept of service for non-SOLASe ships  
Source : A fundamental study on maritime accident prevention systems (page 176, MOF, 2015) 
 
5.2.3 Architecture of SMART-navigation 
  
One of the most important prerequisites to implement e-navigation is the system 
architecture for information exchange, so that, the SMART-navigation services can be 
established as shown in Figure 18. The architecture was designed according to IMO e-
navigation philosophy, enabling the ship-borne and shore-based users to exchange  
                                       
26  For detailed information on each special services for non-SOLAS ships, see page 175 to 179, A 
fundamental study on maritime accident prevention systems (MOF, 2015) 
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information using S-10027 format and based on the maritime cloud service concept via 
various communication networks.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Overall architecture of the SMART-navigation (MOF,2015) 
                                       
27   It has been designated as the common maritime data structure (CMDS) for e-navigation as described in 
the IMO e-navigation SIP. 
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The communications network might be the most important factor in realizing the aims of 
e-navigation. There are a number of limitations in the current maritime communication 
network, as shown in Table 27 below, which are based on analog communications with 
the minimum capacity for essential communication and with regard to safety of 
navigation and emergency situations.  
 
Further, even Korean fishing vessels of less than 5 tons, which represent the majority, at 
more than 87%, among all Korean fishing vessels, have yet to be equipped with 
navigational or emergency communication equipment.  
 
Table 27 Communication networks around the Korean coastal water areas  
 
Source: A fundamental study on maritime accident prevention systems (MOF, 2015, page 36) 
 
With regard to this, SMART-navigation is to provide the LTE-Maritime communication 
network28 as a platform for non-SOLAS ships in order to implement the necessary e-
navigation services. 
  
                                       
28   For LTE-Maritime service, MOF had been allocated the necessary digital communication frequency by 
the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) in 2014. According to the media, MOF 
launched the project to establish LTE-M communication network in 2015, which is carried out by SKT 
telecom (SK Telecom, 2015, August 2). 
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In addition, the relevant communication networks for e-navigation services are to be 
provided with a data structure based on the CMDS29, including the VHF Date Exchange 
(VDE), digital HF/MF and satellite-based communication, configuring their concept as 
shown in Figure 19 below (MOF, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 19 Communication architecture for the SMART-navigation  
Source: A fundamental study on maritime accident prevention systems (MOF,2015,page 228) 
 
5.3 Accident reducing effects of SMART-navigation 
 
5.3.1 Discussion of detailed direct causes reducible by RCOs  
 
The list of the detailed direct causes categorized in this dissertation and the NMA 
statistics are different from each other as examined in Chapters 3 and 4. For example, 
among human error, NMA statistics include detailed direct causes such as 
                                       
29   M. Jonas and J.H. Oltmann (2013) regarded the CMDS as the most important pillar for e-navigation, 
providing the “cement” to the other pillars, including (1) the overarching architecture of e-navigation 
and generalities, (2) shipboard equipment fit for e-navigation, (3) MSPs, (4) communication 
technologies, (5) resilient PNT, and (6) shore-based infrastructure. 
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"injury/sickness", "intoxicated" and "Fatigue/work overload", while KMST statistics do 
not. Such causes are underlying factors rather than direct causes. 
 
However, this does not mean that the accidents caused by these underlying factors were 
excluded in the KMST investigation statistics. The KMST statistics were produced 
based on the direct causes only, not based on the underlying factors. That is why the 
author could not analyze and insert such causes in the detailed direct cause lists. In 
contrast, there are many more detailed direct causes with different names that the KMST 
statistics contain and the NMA statistics do not, and vice versa. 
 
With regard to this, the author has identified the detailed direct causes of KMST, as 
shown in Table 28, based on the description given in the instructions for the KMST 
investigation statistics, in order to make conditions similar to the category of the NMA 
statistics that the FSA team identified and used for the risk and cost-benefit analysis. 
 
For example, the author includes some detailed direct causes, which have different 
names but are considered to be reducible by RCOs, into the relevant group of the direct 
cause as follows: 
 
   among the detailed direct causes of the inadequate handling of machinery or 
cargo, "Lack of checking fuel oil, lubrication oil", "Lack of Maintenance of 
steering/navigational  gears" and "Inadequate Fire machinery" are included in 
the list of detailed direct causes under technical failures; and  
 
   among the detailed direct causes of the external factors, "Other ship's errors" 
and "Deficiency of Aids to Navigation facility External Factors" are included in 
the list of the detailed direct causes under external factors.  
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In addition, the author excludes some of the detailed direct causes, which are not 
considered to be reduced by RCOs as shown in Table 28. For example, 
"Loading/Unloading facility deficiency", "Main Engine trouble" of the technical failures, 
and "Deficiency of shore facilities" of the external Factors were excluded.  
 
As a result, the author extracted 3,366 accident vessels, which involved the detailed 
direct causes preventable by the RCOs of e-navigation, from the total 4,871 accident 
vessels. 
 
Table 28 Identified detailed direct causes  
List of Direct Causes by NMA Shuffled Direct Cause of KMST to match with NMA 
Human 
Errors  
Inadequate observation/ 
inattention 
Poor judgment of ship 
movement 
Fatigue/work overload 
Poor judgment of other factors 
Inadequate planning of voyage 
Intoxicated 
Failure to use navigational aids 
Failure to give way /high speed 
Lack of knowledge/skill/ 
training 
Communication problems 
Injury/sickness 
Use of defective equipment 
Human 
Errors 
(1) Inadequate observation 
(2) Over loading 
(3) Failure to equipments 
(4) Other Navigational failure 
(5) Negligence of duty 
(6) Pilot error/violations 
(7) Inadequate Anchoring 
(8) Inadequate safety management 
(9) Not observing safety manual 
(10) Inadequate positioning 
(11) Inadequate Maneuvering 
(12) Inadequate departure preparing 
(13) Inadequate actions to avoid collision 
(14) Inadequate Course plan and keeping 
(15) Violation of COREG 
(16) Lack of sailing plan 
(17) Lack of preparing heavy weather 
(18) Inadequate Management 
Technical 
Failures 
Technical failure (not related to 
main engine) 
Technical 
Failures 
(19) Other machinery deficiency 
(20) Fatigue of Hull 
(21) Electronic facility deficiency 
(22) Steering gear related deficiency 
(23) Auxiliary machinery deficiency 
(24) Deficiency in closing 
(25) Deficiency of Nav. equipments 
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Inadequate 
Handling 
machinery 
or cargo 
(26) Lack of checking fuel oil/lubrication 
(27) Lack of Maintenance of  
(28) Steering/navigational gears 
(29) Inadequate Fire machinery 
External 
Factors 
Strong currents 
Severe heavy weather 
External 
Factors 
(30) Other ship's errors 
(31) Deficiency of AtoN facility 
The detailed direct causes among the lists 
of the KMST, which are  not 
considered to be reducible by 
RCOs 
 
Technical 
Failures 
(32)Loading/Unloading facility 
deficiency 
(33)Main Engine trouble 
External 
Factors 
(34) Deficiency of shore facilities 
Inadequate 
Handling 
machineries 
or cargos 
(35) Inadequate handing IMDG 
(36) Inadequate Handling cargo 
(37) Inadequate Loading Cargo 
(38) Lack of Eng. Maintenance 
(39) Self-ignition, Explosion of cargo 
(40) Cargo shifted 
Others (41) Other, Unknown 
(42) Irresistible natural disasters 
(43) Irresistible natural disasters 
(typhoon) 
 
Source: Based on the NMA statistics and the KSMT statistics 
 
5.3.2 Discussion of RCOs applicable to non-SOLAS ships 
 
With regard to applying the rate of risk, the author selected the relevant RCOs based on 
the scope of the SMART-navigation services related to the non-SOLAS ships as 
examined in paragraph 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2.  
 
As a result, except for RCO 2 (Bridge alert management), the author identified another 6 
kinds of RCOs that have the same rate of risk reduction as shown in Table 29. The rate 
for non-SOLAS ship is 55% in total, which is 84.6% of the rate of risk reduction for 
SOLAS ships, "65% in total". 
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Table 29 RCOs for non-SOLAS ships  
SOLAS Ships Non-SOLAS Ships 
RCOs Rate of risk 
reduction 
Remark 
RCO 1 
Integration of navigation information and equipment 
including improved software quality assurance 11% 11% 
applied 
RCO 2 Bridge alert management 10% - excluded 
RCO 3 Standardized mode 7% 7% applied 
RCO 4 Automated and standardized ship-shore reporting 8% 8% applied 
RCO 5 
Improved reliability and resilience of onboard PNT 
systems 
8% 8% applied 
RCO 6 Improved shore-based services 7% 7% applied 
RCO 7 Bridge and workstation layout standardization 14% 14% applied 
Total 65% 55% (84.6% of 65%) 
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (pages 37-38) for SOLAS ships only. 
 
5.3.3 Expert survey by questionnaire 
 
The author carried out an expert survey by questionnaire30 through e-mail in order to 
increase the validity of the decisions made in paragraphs 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. The survey was 
focused on assessing the validity of selecting the RCOs as shown in Table 28, which are 
applicable to non-SOLAS ships, and identifying the detailed direct causes as shown in 
Table 29, which are reducible by the RCOs.  
 
Seventeen persons responded in total, whose average experience working for the safety 
of navigation was 14.3 years. The responders are currently working in maritime safety-
related research and development institutes (41.2%, 7 persons), the safety management 
departments of shipping industries (29.4%, 5 persons) and vessel accident investigation 
agencies (29.4%, 5 persons). They were all involved in establishing the SMART-
navigation strategy directly as researchers, and indirectly as participants in the related 
brainstorming sessions and workshops discussing the strategy. 
                                       
30 The questionnaire was drafted according to the guideline on WMU research ethics committee. 
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With regard to the validity of Table 28, 13 persons (76.5%) supported the validity of 
identifying the detailed direct causes as proposed. Among them, 4 persons (23.5%) were 
of the opinion that items 33 to 38 and 43 were also partially reducible by e-navigation, 
and suggested that the service of "remote monitoring ship's systems31", including main 
engine, should be introduced to enhance the management of such items by shore side.  
 
On the other hand, 4 persons (23.5%) pointed out that items 2, 4, 7, 17, 22 to 27, and 30 
are somewhat limited in their ability to be reduced by RCOs. One person (5.9%) insisted 
that the  causes reducible by RCOs should be identified based on the conditions: (1) 
exchanging information between ship and shore should be harmonized, and (2) 
collecting, analyzing and presenting information should be harmonized between ship 
and shore. 
 
In the case of the validity of Table 29, 14 persons (94.1%) supported the validity of 
selecting the RCOs that are applicable to non-SOLAS ships. Among them, 2 persons 
(11.8%) even insisted that RCO 2 (Bridge alert management) should be also selected as 
the RCO that is applicable to non-SOLAS ships, and, in particularly, small non-SOLAS 
ships like fishing vessels need to be provided with it. On the other hand, only one person 
(5.9%) was of the opinion that RCO 7 is not effective to non-SOLAS ships.  
 
In brief, even though 23.5% of opinions differed with regard to the author's proposals for 
Table 28 and 5.9% with regard to Table 29, the majority of the respondents supported 
the validity of the Tables. Further, the Tables were proposed based on reliable facts such 
as the case that the FSA team selected the detailed direct causes for carrying out risk and 
cost-benefit analysis of e-navigation, and the service scopes of SMART-navigation. 
Therefore, the author decided to apply the Tables 28 and 29 as they are for evaluation of 
the effect of SMART-navigation on reducing accidents.  
                                       
31   This was one of the MSPs, but deleted. See para. 2.2.5 for the detail reason. 
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5.3.4 Effects of reducing navigational accidents by SMART-navigation 
 
5.3.4.1 Rate of risk reduction 
 
Table 30 Rate of reduction of direct causes by RCOs  
RCOs 
PLL reduction 
of total 
Scope of detailed direct causes 
expected to be reduced by RCOs 
RCO 7 
Bridge and workstation layout 
standardization 14% 
<Human Errors> 
Inadequate observation/ inattention 
Poor judgment of ship movement 
Fatigue/work overload 
Poor judgment of other factors 
Inadequate planning of voyage 
Intoxicated 
Failure to use navigational aids 
Failure to give way /high speed 
Lack of knowledge/skill/ training 
Communication problems 
Injury/sickness 
Use of defective equipment 
 
<Technical Failures> 
Technical failure (not related to main 
engine) 
 
 <External Factors> 
Strong currents 
Severe heavy weather 
RCO 1 
Integration of navigation 
information and equipment 
including improved software 
quality assurance 
11% 
RCO 2 Bridge alert management 10% 
RCO 4 
Automated and standardized 
ship-shore reporting 
8% 
RCO 5 
Improved reliability and 
resilience of onboard PNT 
systems 
8% 
RCO 3 Standardized mode 7% 
RCO 6 
Improved shore-based services 
7% 
Total 65%  
Source: Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (pages 37-38) 
 
Table 30 shows the rate of potential possibility to reduce the loss of lives (PLL) for 
navigational accidents of SOLAS ships, including collisions and groundings, as 
examined in Chapter 3. However, the rate of risk reduction, "65%", does not mean the 
rate to reduce volume of accidents, but the rate to reduce percentage of selected direct 
causes of navigational accidents by RCOs in terms of PLL as described in paragraph 5.1. 
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Therefore, the author calculated the actual rate of the detailed direct causes to be reduced 
by RCOs by using the formula described in paragraph 5.1. The result of the calculation 
is 52.7% for SOLAS ships as shown in Table 31. The figure in blank, "( )", is the rate for 
non-SOLAS vessels. Based on Table 31, the author calculates the actual rate of the 
volume of accidents to be reduced by RCOs for all ships in Korean water areas and all 
Korean-flagged ships worldwide as shown in Tables 32, 33 and 34, in terms of human 
error, technical failures, and external factors, respectively.  
 
Table 31 Actual rate to reduce the direct cause of the navigational accidents  
Percentage of direct 
causes among 
navigational 
accident(%) 
Selected detail direct causes 
Percentage of 
distribution 
among direct 
cause (%)32 
Rate of 
reduction 
of risks by 
RCOs 
Actual rate to 
reduce each 
detailed direct 
causes by 
RCOs 
Human Errors  
(65%) 
Inadequate observation/ inattention 28 
65% 
(55%) 
18.2 (15.4) 
Poor judgment of ship movement 17 11.2 (9.4) 
Fatigue/work overload 13 8.5 (7.2) 
Poor judgment of other factors 12 7.8 (6.6) 
Inadequate planning of voyage 9 5.9 (5.0) 
Intoxicated 3 2 (1.7) 
Failure to use navigational aids 3 2 (1.7) 
Failure to give way /high speed 3 2 (1.7) 
Lack of knowledge/skill/ training 3 2 (1.7) 
Communication problems 2 1 (1.1) 
Injury/sickness 1 0.6 (0.5) 
Use of defective equipment 0 0 
Total rate to reduce each detailed human errors 61.1% (52%) 
Total rate to reduce direct cause of Human Errors (65%*61.1% = ) 39.7% (33.8) 
Technical Failures 
(18%) 
Technical failure (not related to main 
engine) 
82 65% 53.3% (45.1) 
Total rate to reduce each detailed technical failures 53.3% (45.1) 
Total rate to reduce direct cause of Technical Failures (18% * 53.3% = ) 9.6% (8.1) 
External Factors 
(17%) 
Strong currents 16 
65% 
10.4% (8.8) 
Severe heavy weather 14 9.1% (7.7) 
Total rate to reduce each detailed external factors 19.5% (15.8) 
Total rate to reduce direct cause of External Factors (17% * 19.5% = ) 3.3% (2.8) 
Total rate to reduce navigational accidents 52.7% (44.7) 
Source : Calculated based on Annex 1 of NAV 59/6 (Figures 9, 10 and 11 and  Tables 11 and 12) 
                                       
32 based on the Figure 4, 5 and 6 ( pages 29 to 30 of this dissertation) 
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Table 32 Human error cause distribution 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
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Table 33           Technical failure cause distribution  
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base.  
 
Table 34 External factors distribution 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base 
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5.3.4.2 The effects of reducing accidents  
 
Table 35, which combines Tables 32, 33 and 34, shows the apparent rate of reducing the 
relevant accidents involving SMART-navigation, without classifying the ship types of 
the SOLAS and Non-SOLAS ships. For example, 64.9% among total accidents, 
including 22.9% for non-fishing vessels and 42.0% for fishing vessels, are expected to 
be reduced by introducing e-navigation.  
 
Table 35 Apparent effects on reducing accidents by the SMART-navigation 
Accident Type Human 
Errors 
Technical 
Failure 
External 
Factor 
Total 
Actual Effect 
Non-
Fishing 
Vessels 
Navigational 
Accident 
Actual % 803 
(23.9%) 
 25 
(0.7%) 
828 
(24.6%) 
16.1% Risk Reduction Rate 65.1%  65% 
Effect 15.6%  0.5 
Non-
Navigational 
Actual % 
282 
(8.4%) 
64 
(1.9%) 
7 
(0.2%) 
353 
(10.5%) 
6.8% Risk Reduction Rate 65.3% 64.9% 65% 
Effect 5.5% 1.2% 0.1% 
Sum 
Actual % 
1,085 
(32.2%) 
64 
(1.9%) 
32 
(0.95%) 1,181 
(35.1%) 
22.9% 
Effect 21.1% 1.2% 0.6% 
Fishing 
Vessels 
Navigational 
Accident 
Actual % 
1,155 
(34.3%) 
2 
(0.1%) 
16 
(0.5%) 1,173 
(34.8%) 22.5% Risk Reduction Rate 64.9% 65% 64.9% 
Effect 22.2% - 0.3% 
Non-
Navigational 
Actual % 
740 
(22.0%) 
261 
(7.8%) 
11 
(0.3%) 
1,012 
(30.1%) 
19.5% Risk Reduction Rate 64.8% 64.9% 65% 
Effect 14.2% 5.1% 0.2% 
Sum 
Actual % 
1,895 
(56.3%) 
263 
(7.8%) 
27 
(0.8%) 2,185 
(64.9%) 
42.0% 
Effect 36.4% 5.1% 0.5% 
Total 
Actual % 
2,980 
(88.5%) 
327 
(9.7%) 
59 
(1.8%) 3,366 
(100%) 
64.9% 
Effect 57.5% 6.3% 1.1% 
 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014)  
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However, in this table, both SOLAS and non-SOLAS ships accidents are combined, and 
their rates of risk reduction are different as explained in paragraph 5.3.4.1 and as shown 
in Table 31. Therefore, it is necessary to convert Table 35 again, by applying the 
appropriate rates to the SOLAS and non-SOLAS ships, in order to discuss the exact 
effects on reducing  accidents.  The converting conditions are as follow: 
 
  The risk reduction rate for SOLAS ships by seven RCOs is 65%, while the risk 
reduction rate for non-SOLAS ships by seven RCOs is 55%, which is 84.6% of 
65%, as explained in paragraph 5.3.2. 
  The accident distribution of SOLAS ship and non-SOLAS ship among total 
accidents are 57.9% and 42.1% respectively, calculated based on Table 36. 
  
Table 36 SOLAS and non-SOLAS ship distribution among accidents ships  
Category 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 
Q'ty of ships Distribution 
Non 
Fishing 
SOLAS 119 177 171 156 163 786(57.9%) 16.27% 
Non- SOLAS 71 112 138 132 119 572(42.1%) 11.83% 
Total 190 289 309 288 282 1,358(100%)  
Fishing Non- SOLAS 725 672 888 653 536 3,474 71.90% 
 
Source: Preliminary feasibility study on e-navigation (p. 5-44), which was carried out by the Ministry of                  
Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) in 2014 
 
Based on the above condition, the author finally calculates the effects of reducing 
accidents involving SMART-navigation as shown in Table 3733. 
 
According to Table 37, SMART-navigation is expected to reduce more than the 56.6% 
of total accidents of 3,366 vessels, including 13% of SOLAS ships and 43.6% of non-
SOLAS ships, including fishing vessels.  
                                       
33  To see each effect based on the total number of accidents, "4,871", it is necessary to multiply 69.9 % 
with rate calculated in these Tables: 69.9% is calculated by 3,366, divided by 4,871. This is because 
that the Table 35 was calculated based on the accident vessels of 3,366 as described in the paragraph 
5.3.1 and in the Table 29. 
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In the case of navigational accidents, including collisions and groundings, more than 
33.9 %, composing 14.8% for non-fishing vessels and 19.1% for fishing vessels, are 
expected to be reduced. Even the non-navigational accidents are expected to be reduced 
up to 22.7%, including 6.2% for non-fishing vessels and 16.5% for fishing vessels. In 
terms of the direct causes, 50.2% of the accidents caused by human error are expected to 
be reduced, and 5.4% of the accidents caused by  technical failures and 1% of the 
accidents caused by external factors.  
 
Table 37 Effects on reducing accidents by the SMART-navigation 
Accident Type 
Human 
Errors 
Technic
al 
Failure 
External 
Factor 
Total 
Actual Effect 
Non-
Fishing 
Vessels 
Navig-
ational 
accident 
SOLAS 
Actual % 
465 
(13.8%) 
 
14 
(0.4%) 
828 
(24.6%) 
14.8% 
Risk Reduction Rate 65.1%  65% 
Effect 8.9%  0.3% 
Non-
SOLAS 
Actual % 338 
(10.0%) 
 11 
(0.3%) 
Risk Reduction Rate 55.1%  55.0% 
Effect 5.5%  0.1% 
Non-
Navig-
ational 
SOLAS 
Actual % 
163 
(4.8%) 
37 
(1.1%) 
4 
(0.1%) 
353 
(10.5%) 
6.2% 
Risk Reduction Rate 65.3% 64.9% 65% 
Effect 3.1% 0.7% - 
Non-
SOLAS 
Actual % 
119 
(3.5%) 
27 
(0.8%) 
3 
(0.1%) 
Risk Reduction Rate 55.2% 54.9% 55% 
Effect 1.9% 0.4% 0.1% 
Sum 
Actual % 
1,085 
(32.2%) 
64 
(1.9%) 
32 
(0.95%) 1,181 
(35.1%) 
21.0% 
Effect 19.4% 1.1% 0.5% 
Fishing 
Vessels 
Navigational  
Actual % 
1,155 
(34.3%) 
2 
(0.1%) 
16 
(0.5%) 1,173 
(34.8%) 
19.1% 
Risk Reduction Rate 54.9% 55% 54.9% 
Effect 18.8% - 0.3% 
Non-Navigational 
Actual % 
740 
(22.0%) 
261 
(7.8%) 
11 
(0.3%) 1,012 
(30.1%) 
16.5% 
Risk Reduction Rate 54.8% 54.9% 55% 
Effect 12.0% 4.3% 0.2% 
Sum 
Actual % 
1,895 
(56.3%) 
263 
(7.8%) 
27 
(0.8%) 2,185 
(64.9%) 
35.6% 
Effect 30.8% 4.3% 0.5% 
Total 
Actual % 2,980 
(88.5%) 
327 
(9.7%) 
59 
(1.8%) 
3,366 
(100%) 
56.6% 
Effect 50.2% 5.4% 1.0% 
Source: KMST investigation statistics and data base (2014) 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation aimed to evaluate how and to what extent vessel accidents could be 
reduced by introducing e-navigation application into the maritime sector. The questions 
were examined by a comprehensive case study, especially investigating the Korean 
shipping. Focus was laid on accidents in Korean waters and all Korean-flagged ships 
worldwide as well.  
 
For that purpose, the IMO's methodological approach to establishing  the e-navigation 
SIP, and especially the methodology used for the risk and cost-benefit analysis of the 
SIP has been studied and adapted to the Korean SMART-navigation project. The 
SMART-navigation is reviewed, its scope of services and tool kits to be introduced, in 
order to quantitatively evaluate its potential effects on non-SOLAS ships and SOLAS 
ships as well.  
 
Finally, this dissertation aims to provide a sample to IMO Member States for effectively 
and efficiently introducing respectively prioritized e-navigation tool kits of e-navigation. 
Member States may apply the methodology developed and applied in this dissertation to 
their specific situation and especially taking into account potential effects on non-
SOLAS vessels. This is suggested because the situation of maritime safety is different 
from country to country while IMO's e-navigation concept shows effects on reducing 
accidents for SOLAS ships only.  
 
 85 
 
For the mentioned purpose, the author proposed a set of formulas, to evaluate and 
quantify the effects of e-navigation on reducing vessel accidents considering SOLAS but 
also non-SOLAS ships. The proposed set of formulas is applicable to other Member 
States of the IMO, and not only valid for the Republic of Korea.  
 
In addition, the author provided results of evaluating the effects of SMART-navigation, 
by applying the formula, as a kind of model case for other Member States references. It 
is hoped that this study will be referred to the maritime safety policy bodies of the 
Member States of IMO, as well as to the practices of the maritime sectors such as 
shipping companies, crews on board ships and manufacturers developing e-navigation 
related systems. 
 
At the outset, in Chapter 2, the author examined IMO e-navigation tool kits, and 
especially how they had been developed and how they are assessed to be able to reduce  
the risks causing navigational accidents, including collisions and groundings, by up to 
65%. 
 
As a result, the author identified 3 kinds of tool kits, including 5 kinds of solutions, 7 
kinds of RCOs and 16 kinds of MSPs. They are all included in the SIP of IMO e-
navigation concept. 
 
E-navigation, among others, aims to increase the capability of shore based stations to 
manage and assist in improving safety of navigation by supporting decision making and 
provision of safety information to crews on board ships, so as to prevent or detect human 
errors that might lead to accidents.  
 
Human error that causes accidents is one of the most significant concerns of maritime 
sectors. In fact, according to numerous sources most accidents happen mainly due to 
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human error, and such accidents even have a rising trend. Human error is considered to 
be mainly rooted in fatigue, the lack of situational awareness and the safety culture of 
crews on board ships.  
 
There have been limitations to preventing human error in terms of quantity and quality 
of information, complexity, lack of providing sufficient support to decision making and 
to effectively help avoid dangerous navigational situations, and lack of response to 
emergency situations in a timely and adequate manner. Further, this is clearly supported 
by user needs, which reflect the concerns experienced most often during their work, as 
surveyed for e-navigation as shown, e.g., in the IMO document NAV 55/INF. 9. 
 
However, these problems are expected to be solved by e-navigation, through 
implementation of its tool kits, by supporting a ship's decision making to avoid accidents. 
Moreover, e-navigation will allow for provision ships with safety information and 
warning of dangerous situations, from shore based stations in a timely and adequate 
manner. In addition, due to the digitalized and standardized e-navigation systems with 
harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of marine 
information on board and ashore, e-navigation could greatly improve the efficiency of 
maritime-related businesses. Thus, IMO is able to simultaneously address safety and 
efficiency of navigation, which was generally not possible in the past.  
 
This dissertation has analyzed the 3-step-methodology of the FSA team in order to 
evaluate the effects of e-navigation on reducing accidents, and especially estimate the 
rate of risk reduction. The FSA team determined the rate of risk reduction through 
mainly 3 steps: (1) determining RCOs; (2) analyzing risks; and (3) determining the rate 
based on the first and second results. This basic steps have been identified and prepared 
for a more comprehensive assessment. 
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A case study of the extended evaluation of potential risk reduction of e-navigation has 
been conducted in Chapter 4. For that purpose, vessel accident data for all ships in 
Korean water areas and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide during the period 2009 to 
2013, based on KMST investigation statistics were analyzed. This analysis was carried 
out from several points of view: the categories of SOLAS ships and non-SOLAS ships, 
fishing vessels and non-fishing vessels; the categories of navigational accidents, 
including collisions and groundings, and others; as well as the direct cause categories of 
human error, technical failure and external factors.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 5, the author discussed the effect of SMART-navigation in terms of 
to what extent it could reduce vessel accidents. The effects were calculated based on the 
same methodology used by the FSA team for the risk and cost-benefit analyses of the 
IMO e-navigation SIP, and the rate of risk reduction, 65%, as the coefficient of the 
formula that the author proposed in the paragraph 5.1.  
 
Additionally, the author identified the detailed direct causes of accidents based on the 
KMST investigation statistics in order to make their scope similar to the IHS Fairplay 
database and the Norwegian investigation statistics that the FSA team used. Further, the 
author selected six RCOs, including RCO 1, RCO 3, RCO 4, RCO 5, RCO 6 and RCO 7, 
which are applicable to non-SOLAS ships, among seven RCOs that the FSA team 
identified for SOLAS ships. The selection of RCOs was based on the service scope of 
the SMART-navigation plans for non-SOLAS ships.  
 
With regard to the identified detailed direct causes and RCOs above, the author carried 
out a spotlight questionnaire survey to experts in order to verify the validity of the 
methodology. The questionnaire was responded by 17 in total, whose average 
experience in working for the safety of navigation-related field was 14.3 years. Among 
them, 76.5% supported the validity of identifying detailed direct causes and 94.1% 
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supported the validity of identifying RCOs. 
 
The most important point from the findings in Chapter 5 is that the evaluation results 
show that the situation of maritime safety is different among different countries as the 
author assumed in the background.  
 
For example, in the case of the Republic of Korea, 64.1% of non-fishing vessel accidents, 
including 37.2% of SOLAS ship accidents and 26.9% of non-SOLAS ship accidents, 
involved in navigational accidents. These figures are different from the statistic, 43.2%, 
that the FSA team obtained based on IHS Fairplay and the NMA statistics. However, in 
the case of calculating all kinds of accidents involving both SOLAS and non-SOLAS 
ships, more than 43.5 % involved navigational accidents, including 18.3% for non-
fishing vessels and 25.1% for fishing vessels, which is more similar to the statistic, 
43.2%, that the FSA team obtained. 
 
In brief, as outcome of this research is shown, the effect of implementing e-navigation, 
SMART-navigation is expected to reduce accidents by more than 56.6% the total 
accidents, including 13% of SOLAS ships and 43.6% of non-SOLAS ships (including 
fishing vessels). In the case of navigational accidents, including collisions and 
groundings, more than 33.9 %, including 14.8% for non-fishing vessels and 19.1% for 
fishing vessels, are expected to be reduced, while the NMA statistics show 22.8% for 
these accidents of SOLAS ships only.  
 
Even the non-navigational accidents are expected to be reduced by up to 22.7%, 
including 6.2% for non-fishing vessels and 16.5% for fishing vessels. In terms of the 
direct causes, 50.2% of the accidents caused by human error are expected to be reduced, 
and 5.4% of the accidents caused by the technical failures and 1% of the accidents 
caused by the external factors.  
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With regard to the results above, however, it should be noted that the coefficient acts as 
the most important factor in calculating the effect of e-navigation on reducing accidents 
according to each detailed direct cause of vessel accidents. The author calculated the 
effects in the case study by applying the coefficient, which was quantified by experts 
through a somewhat qualitative methodology at a workshop during the FSA for the IMO 
e-navigation strategy.  
 
However, as former research pointed out the traditional method to quantify the rate of 
risk reduction through estimation by experts, there might be problems related to using 
the subjective probability as a calculation of uncertainty in risk analysis (Li et al, 2011).  
Therefore, the author concluded that there is an urgent need for further investigation into 
the determination of the coefficient and the set of formulas, which is proposed in  
paragraph 5.1, as follows: 
 
  To improve the result of this dissertation and make it more meaningful, it is 
desirable to quantify the coefficient using a more quantitative methodology and 
draft it into the result of this dissertation. 
  For this, the quantitative relationship and dependencies between the accident 
types and the detailed direct causes should be researched in more detail and 
comprehensively. 
  Further, the quantitative relationship between the RCOs and their rate of risk 
reduction should be researched based on the research results above.  
  The research recommended above might be done based on statistical 
calculations using actual databases, for example, Bayesian Network (BN) as 
mentioned in Chapter 3. 
 
The other point that the author wishes to highlight as a rather general conclusion is the 
importance of human error and especially non-SOLAS ships as follows: 
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First, one of the most important aims of e-navigation among others is to prevent human 
error. The KSMT statistics show that more than 88.1% among navigational accidents 
involving non-fishing vessels and 92.0% of navigational accidents involving fishing 
vessels were caused by human error as analyzed in Chapter 4. Both of them are higher 
than the 43.2% that the FSA team found based on NMA statistics as shown in Chapter 3. 
This might mean that there are possibilities for the Republic of Korea to gain more 
benefits by introducing SMART-navigation, by targeting its services to non-SOLAS 
ships as well as SOLAS ships.  
 
Second, it should be noted that the accidents caused by combined multiple human errors 
might be preventable if one of them had been prevented or corrected in advance and 
their chain had been blocked. This is clearly supported by the research conducted by 
Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987). They found that most accidents, 93%, were caused by 
a combination of multiple reasons and each of the human errors in an accident acted as 
one of the conditions to cause the accident.  
 
This can be interpreted in a way that e-navigation has potential to reduce many more 
accidents than the results shown in Chapter 5 because e-navigation aims to increase the 
safety of navigation by reducing human error and its strategy was driven based on user 
needs. The user needs reflect problems experienced most often that might potentially 
cause human error and lead to an accident, during their work on board ships.  
 
Third, the KMST investigation statistics show that more than 83.7% of all accidents 
involved non-SOLAS ships including fishing vessels as shown in the Table 35 in 
paragraph 5.3.4.2. The statistics show that non-SOLAS vessels are much more 
vulnerable to accidents, and it is mainly due to lack of the navigational equipment on 
board ships and workforce as explained in Chapter 5. This is clearly supported by 
research of An (2011). He emphasized that non-SOLAS ships, including fishing vessels 
 91 
 
and small non-fishing vessels, are more vulnerable to marine accidents compared to 
SOLAS Convention ships, based on the fact that 72.2% of marine accidents involved 
small-sized ships of less than 100 G/T and 67% of marine accidents occurred in coastal 
waters among total Korea-related accidents during 2005 to 2010. 
 
The fact above might mean that there is potential for SOLAS ships to face accidents due 
to such vulnerable non-SOLAS ships because they interface with each other during their 
operations nearby coastal waters and in port areas. Therefore, it is more urgent and 
significant for non-SOLAS ships apply e-navigation in terms of reducing the 
vulnerability to cause accidents as shown in the case of SMART-navigation. 
 
Lastly, human error is related to the human element. Crews consist of individual human 
beings living in a modernized society. They have families just like the people who live 
and work ashore. In addition, many human errors, even though this dissertation did not 
examine that, are caused by fatigue rooted in the work burden.  
 
Therefore, the author would like to emphasize that it is time to change the environment 
of maritime sectors. That is, with modern technologies and demands of the stake-holders 
of maritime sectors, e-navigation will significantly contribute to reduce human error, 
which is the main reason for vessel accidents as experienced by the maritime sectors. In 
addition, the author hopes that e-navigation is able to provide crews with welfare such as 
the opportunity to enjoy the internet and chatting, and even to quarrel with their husband 
or wife ashore while reducing their work burden on board ship. 
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